Toyama Dec 8 Forum

First of all, I would like to express my wholehearted gratitude to Mr. Alyn Ware, the coordinator of Parliamentary Network of Nuclear Disarmament and the members of his secretariat, for organizing this important forum on nuclear disarmament at this crucial stage. In addition, I would like to thank the government of New Zealand for being such a wonderful host to us all participants. New Zealand has always been a source of profound inspiration in our movement for nuclear disarmament, and I am one of many Japanese politicians who share Prime Minister Helen Clark ' s determination to abolish all nuclear weapons on earth in this century.

I am honored to be given a chance to address this assembly of fellow parliamentarians from all over the world, government officials, experts, and members of civil society and all others working on nuclear disarmament. As I stand here as a representative of PNND Japan, let me briefly introduce our activity at the outset.

PNND Japan was established in June 2002 with parliamentarians participating from all six major political parties of Japan. It was the very first move in the history of Japanese Diet to respond to an international networking of parliamentarians and civil society on nuclear disarmament issue. In this regard, I must acknowledge a tremendous effort of Japanese NGOs in working on us to realize this. In particular, we are grateful to tireless works of Mr. Hiromichi Umebayashi of Peace Depot , a key Japanese NGO, who also serves as PNND Coordinator for East Asia.

Our chapter, which currently has the membership of 40 parliamentarians, is determined to bring about positive changes in Japanese efforts toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We have taken every possible occasion, inside and outside the parliament, to disseminate the significance of nuclear disarmament issue among the Japanese people.

We also appeal to the government of Japan to pay due attention to the problem of innate contradiction in its current policy, namely, that Japan still relies its security on nuclear deterrence while advocating the abolition of nuclear weapons. Of course, we recognize that the threat of nuclear weapons does exist in our region and the Japanese government places the protection of its citizens on the top of policy priority. However, in the light of the promises that have been made by nuclear weapons states in the NPT process, what Japan has to do more is to play a more intensified role in working on those countries to live up to their promises, that is, demonstrating tangible progress towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. We welcome the commitment of Japanese government to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the commencement of FMCT negotiations. But it is only a part of the first step toward the ultimate objective.

With the 2005 NPT Review Conference coming in our sight, PNND Japan has begun discussing the ways in which our opinions can be reflected more in the actual deliberations between governments ' delegates. Traditionally, influence of parliamentarians over diplomatic negotiations has been rather weak in Japan. We may have played second fiddle even to activities of civil society on this arena. Seriously reflecting upon this weakness, we are thinking of the following actions: to create formal frameworks of discussion in the parliament to publicly unfold our perspectives on nuclear disarmament and future of NPT; to follow suit of New Zealand and others by securing seats of parliamentarians in Japanese delegation to the Review Conference. This may not materialize in the end, but endeavor has to be made for parliamentary opinions to be more clearly heard in one way or another.

Mr. Chairman,

The post- 9.11 situation has given us a number of new security challenges. Threats of terrorism are no illusion now, and fear of indiscriminate attacks upon our innocent citizens by ruthless terrorists seems to have haunted every corner of the world. Under the circumstances, many governments, including the Japanese government, have been forced to review and quickly implement measures against potential terrorist activities. Danger of those terrorists acquiring and even using nuclear weapons against indiscriminate targets is increasingly viewed as a real one.

In this alarming context, some people seem to re-emphasize the utility of sophisticated military technology and highly destructive weaponry as deterrence to terrorists, and an aggressive approach to international conflicts is apparently given stronger legitimacy in certain circles. In my view, this sort of logic is destined to collapse in an ultimate sense, for deterrence cannot essentially work with terrorists, particularly those with suicidal inclinations.

A salient feature of post-9.11 world is an increase of such threats that cannot be deterred by traditional military methods. Given this point, fundamental solution should be found in our efforts of nuclear disarmament and strengthening the rule of law in international society. On the latter point, I would like to congratulate the foundation of International Criminal Court, which will fill the ' impunity gap ' by bringing to justice those responsible for crimes of the most serious kind. The ICC is an epoch-making challenge toward strengthening the rule of law in international society, and we fully support its activities.

Coming back to the original theme, the danger in question here is a combination of ruthless terrorists and nuclear weapons. In order to eliminate this danger, we have to deal with both components of the combination. To tackle only the former problem and do nothing with the latter cannot be justified.

This contention can be further strengthened if we consider another contemporary problem. That is, we now face the weakening control of state authorities over nuclear material. The old regime of placing all nuclear-related material and technologies under perfect state control has now come to its limits, largely thanks to globalization. In today ' s globalized world, movements of people, information, and technology are getting faster day by day, and the means of delivery has diversified. It is extremely difficult for many governments to monitor all of these movements. Recent stories of proliferation of nuclear technologies through Dr. Khan ' s underground network and frequent occurrences of terrorist incidents in many parts of the world are all testimony to this unfortunate situation.

By stating this problem, I am not arguing that we should be pessimistic about the effectiveness of inspection and verification under the NPT system and IAEA safeguard system. We must continue our efforts to improve the current inspection and verification regimes through promoting progress on the universalization of Additional protocol and the strengthening of export control.

But my point is that no one can justify pacing down the nuclear disarmament process agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference by referring to the rise of terrorism. We should say instead, ' because of the recent terrorist problem, we need to accelerate the process to achieve NPT goals ' . I believe this thinking constituted a major background against which UNSC Resolution 1540 was adopted early this year.

With regard to new developments outside the NPT regime on nonproliferation such as ' Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI) ' and a series of Japan-ASEAN joint initiatives at different levels, we basically welcome such initiatives. Nonetheless, these new initiatives should not be used as an excuse for inaction of any participating government on the NPT commitments. NPT has been and will always be the key pillar of our nuclear disarmament movement.

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to acknowledge that one effective and realistic way of decreasing the danger of nuclear weapons is to create as much ' nuclear free zone ' as possible on this planet. In this regard, I would like to pay high respect to countries of the Southern Hemisphere and Southeast Asia for having successfully formed such zones in the past, and now moving toward establishing a ' Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas Nuclear Weapons Free Zone ' .

It may be only natural to expect that Japan, the only country that has suffered nuclear devastation in the past, would take initiatives in creating a similar nuclear free zone in Northeast Asia. As far as the Japanese government is concerned, however, no official proposal has been made. The government sees it unrealistic to propose such an option unless certain conditions are met. ' Certain conditions ' include: all countries concerned, including nuclear weapons states, must agree; and a creation of such zone is in accord with principles of international law, including free movement on the open sea.

Given the presence of the United States, Russia and China in the region, it is certainly not easy to envision, at this moment, a successful roadmap to creating a nuclear free Northeast Asia. But on this particular issue there has been a shrewd proposal from a Japanese NGO leader, Mr. Umebayashi, which deserves attention here. This proposal is presented as a ' realistic scenario ' because it is based on already declared policies of states concerned, and therefore the first condition of the Japanese government might be cleared.

This plan is called ' a three-plus-three arrangement ' as it defines three non-nuclear weapon states (Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the DPRK) as ' core constituents ' , while designating three nuclear weapon states (the U.S., Russia, and China) as ' supporting constituents ' . Mr. Umebayashi argues that in the light of the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula between the two Koreas and Japan ' s three non-nuclear principles (not to manufacture, possess, and allow bringing-in nuclear weapons), the three states can form a nuclear free zone covering the Korean peninsula and Japanese archipelago. The perceived merit of this part of the arrangement is that the three can build up mutual confidence in each other ' s non-nuclear policy as they work in the same verification system.

The other three with nuclear weapons would be required to provide legally binding security assurances against using or threatening to use nuclear weapons in the zone. This requirement is not unreasonable in the light of the declared policies of these states, as can be most symbolically seen in UNSC Resolution 984 in 1995. Besides, nuclear weapon states have long been called upon by non-nuclear weapons states to give legally binding security assurances in order to strike a balance between the two groups of those with and without nuclear weapons under the NPT agreements.

With a number of other controversial issues such as the abduction issue and North Korea ' s withdrawal from NPT abundant in the region, to reach an agreement on a nuclear free zone seems enormously difficult at the moment. Nonetheless, a prospect for future agreement still remains.

The present framework of the Six Party Talks on the North Korean problems is consisted of exactly the same six countries in Umebayashi ' s ' three-plus-three ' plan. There is an opinion in Japan that this six-party structure should be maintained even after its current missions on North Korea are complete. Northeast Asia is still circumscribed by the shadows of the Cold War in the sense that the countries of the region do not have a multinational framework where regional security problems can be discussed on a regular basis. I sincerely hope that the institutionalization of the Six Party Talks as a new platform for regional security coordination should be seriously taken by the leaders of states in the region, and it is in this context that my hope for a nuclear free Northeast Asia does not die out.

Mr. Chairman,

Japanese people are still strongly committed to nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. Almost in every opinion poll, more than 95 % of the citizens of Japan express their support for the conclusion of a treaty that would prohibit the very existence of nuclear weapons. It is our absolute belief that the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki should never be repeated. Taking seriously to our heart this popular will, we, as representatives of Japanese people and members of PNND Japan, are determined to work harder in our efforts on nuclear disarmament. With an impetus today ' s forum gives us, I promise you, PNND Japan will move forward, first, to the success of the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Thank you very much for your attention.