Nuclear Doctrine
Nuclear Deterrence
Nuclear
deterrence aims to prevent unwanted action by an opponent
by convincing them that the resultant costs would exceed
any gains. Such costs would involve massive destruction
from a nuclear strike.
Nuclear
deterrence involves several paradoxes. For example,
the threat of use of nuclear weapons is supposed to
prevent war, including the use of nuclear weapons. But
to be credible, the deterring state must demonstrate
a readiness to use nuclear weapons, which increases
the probability of such use, particularly over a long
period of time. Thus, nuclear deterrence is an inherently
unstable policy.
Nuclear
deterrence has evolved from the simple threat of massive
retaliation to a range of forms. It includes: counter-force
; the threat of nuclear retaliation against military
targets, counter-value ; the threat of nuclear retaliation
against the opposing state in general, flexible response
; the deployment of sub-strategic or tactical weapons
for battlefield use or for use as an interim step prior
to massive retaliation; first-strike ; the use of nuclear
weapons in response to a conventional attack or to pre-emptively
destroy the weapons of an opponent, extended deterrence
; the extension of nuclear deterrence to cover the territories
of non-nuclear allies, existential deterrence ; the
ability to develop nuclear weapons without actual deployment.
See:
The Naked Nuclear Emperor: Debunking Nuclear Deterrence
, Commander R. Green (ret), www.disarmsecure.org
United
States
We
need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both
offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can
no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear
retaliation. Defenses can strengthen deterrence
by reducing the incentive for proliferation. We
need a new framework that allows us to build missile
defenses to counter the different threats of today's
world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints
of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty."
President
George Bush, May 1, 2001 |
In
January 2002, the US Administration completed a Nuclear
Posture Review. In many respects the NPR continues policies
outlined in more detail in the 1996 US Joint Chiefs
of Staff Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations.
Key points in the document included:
.
A strong US nuclear capability is necessary to deter aggression
. Nuclear weapons could be used for political or
military reasons . Nuclear weapons are not just
to deter a nuclear strike, but have a role in deterring,
or pre-emptively destroying, any weapons of mass destruction.
This appears to contradict previous US assurances
not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.
. The US requires a wide range of nuclear systems
tailored for a variety of military and political objectives.
The
1996 Doctrine includes detailed plans for nuclear strikes
and describes targets for such strikes including: WMD,
their delivery systems and support units; ground combat
units; air defense facilties; naval installations and
vessels; on-state actors that possess WMD; and underground
facilties. In order to be capable of delivering such
strikes at a moment's notice, the US maintains over
2000 nuclear weapons on high alert status.
In
May 2001, US President George Bush outlined "new concepts
of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive
forces." The new policy was an admission that nuclear
deterrence was not infallible, but the solution was
not to abandon the current nuclear policy but supplement
it with missile defence and conventional forces. The
2002 Nuclear Policy Review confirmed this "New Triad"
of capabilities, as well as the intention of the US
to modernise nuclear delivery systems and maintain a
strong nuclear stockpile indefinitely. Thus the contradiction
between US policy and its NPT commitments remains.
See:
Our
issues page
US
Nuclear Doctrine www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine
Nuclear Posture Review , www.basic.int.org
Russia
In
January 2000, the Russian Government released its new
nuclear policy in a document entitled Concept of
National Security . The document updates policy
statements made in 1993 and 1997, and indicates a heightened
sense of conflict with NATO and the US on nuclear issues,
and an increased reliance on nuclear weapons. It affirms
a strengthened Russian policy for the use of nuclear
weapons, not only in response to a nuclear attack, but
also to a conventional attack.
Cooperation
between the US and Russia, including the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Programs to secure Russian nuclear
weapons and fissile materials, have come under strain
in the wake of NATO expansion, the NATO attacks on Serbia
and the decision by the US to move ahead with National
Missile Defense. Russia no longer maintains a 'no-first-use'
policy, and is considering re-deployment of tactical
nuclear weapons. The Russian Duma (Parliament) ratified
START II on the basis that the ABM Treaty be maintained.
Thus US plans to withdraw from the ABM are prompting
Russia to maintain a number of START II missiles, and
possibly even increase the numbers of warheads on some
of them.
See:
Russian
/ Soviet Doctrine http://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/
Russia's
Strategic Priorities , Celeste A. Wallander, Arms
Control Today, Jan/Feb 2002
For
more information see our issues page
China
China
joined the "nuclear club" in 1964 with a nuclear test
at Lop Nor. At the same time China announced a 'no-first-use'
policy. It joined the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in 1984 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) in 1992. In comparison to Russia and the USA ,
China maintains a limited nuclear capability, emphasising
the deterrent effect of retaliation rather than flexible
use strategies. However, US development of ABM systems
are perceived by China to be eroding the retaliation
capabilities and thus the deterrence value of their
nuclear arsenal. In response, China may increase its
arsenal. China has opposed NMD and called for negotiations
to prevent an arms race in outer space. It has a policy
of nuclear disarmament, and supports negotiations on
a nuclear weapons convention, but calls on the US and
Russia to bring their stockpiles down to numbers commensurate
with those of the other nuclear powers as the first
step.
See:
Chinese Nuclear Doctrine Savita
Pande, IDSA
www.idsa-india.org/an-mar00-2.html
For
more information see our issues page
NATO
The
US deploys tactical nuclear weapons in seven NATO countries
( Greece , Italy , Germany , Turkey , Belgium , UK and
the Netherlands ), and has agreements with these countries
allowing them to take control of the weapons and use
them in a state of war. These agreements are somewhat
controversial with some NPT members claiming they are
in violation of NPT Articles I and II.
NATO
policy, like that of the US , UK , France and Russia
, allows for the possible 'first-use' of nuclear weapons.
In the 1980s NATO Military Command maintained detailed
plans for the use of nuclear weapons in specific scenarios.
However, in recent years it has developed "adaptive
targeting capability" designed to allow NATO commanders
to develop target plans and nuclear weapons employment
plans on short notice.
NATO
reliance on nuclear weapons was reaffirmed in the 1999
Strategic Concept released on NATO's 50 th anniversary.
Attempts by Canada , Germany and the Netherlands to
initiate a wide debate on NATO nuclear doctrine were
rebuffed by the US , UK and France . However, they did
agree to an ongoing review of NATO nuclear policy.
See:
Martin Butcher NATO Nuclear Policy
Nuclear
Futures Series , BASIC, 1999. www.basicint.org
NATO
Notes . Centre for European Security and Disarmament
www.cesd.org
For
more information see our issues page
United Kingdom
In
July 1998 Britain 's Labour government announced several
changes to its nuclear forces following a Strategic
Defense Review:
.
Only one British submarine will patrol at any given time
carrying 48 warheads . The submarine will patrol
at a reduced state of alert - capable of firing its missiles
within several days instead of within several minutes
. Britain will maintain fewer than 200 operationally
available warheads In
addition, the United Kingdom has supported the concept
of multi-lateral negotiations leading to the elimination
of nuclear weapons, but says that such negotiations
cannot start until the nuclear stockpiles of the US
and Russia are reduced commensurate to the stockpiles
of the other NPT NWS.
In
preparation for nuclear disarmament negotiations, the
Defence Department conducted a feasibility study on
verification of the elimination of nuclear weapons.
See:
British
Nuclear Policy www.basicint.org
Confidence,
Security and Verification.
Aldermaston
Weapons Est., 2000. www.awe.co.uk
For
more information see our issues page
France
On
February 13, 1960 , France became the fourth country
to test a nuclear device by detonating its first atomic
bomb in Reggane ( Sahara ). The decision to go nuclear
was prompted by WWII experience of occupation by Germany
and the differences with allies post World War II, especially
in the Suez Canal crisis. Since then, nuclear weapons
have been integral to France 's international political
status as well as to military doctrine. At the International
Court of Justice hearing on nuclear weapons, France
argued that it had a special right and duty, as a responsible
nuclear weapon state, to maintain nuclear weapons for
the purpose of international peace and security.
France
has developed both tactical and strategic weapons. However,
the military purpose for its tactical weapons is to
serve primarily as warning shots in a strategic conflict
and not as battlefield weapons.
The
most comprehensive statement on French nuclear doctrine
was contained in the 1994 Livre Blanc (White Paper)
on Defence. It re-affirmed existing doctrine on the
possible threat or use of nuclear weapons in international
or regional conflicts, but did not adopt the US doctrine
of counter-proliferation roles for nuclear weapons.
See:
French Nuclear Policy After the Cold War ,
Camille
Grand, Paris
www.idsa-india.org/an-jul8-3.html
For
more information see our issues page
India
"
the refusal of the nuclear weapon states to consider
the elimination of nuclear weapons...continues to be
the single biggest threat to international peace and
security ¼
It
is because of the continuing threat posed to India by
the deployment of nuclear weapons ¼
that
we have been forced to carry out these tests." - Indian
Press Statement, May 15, 1998
In 1998 India openly tested nuclear weapons and declared
that it had achieved a nuclear capability. It had been
widely suspecte d
that India had an undisclosed nuclear capability since
the early 1970s. The decision to openly declare nuclear
capability has been attributed to a combination of reasons
including domestic popularity, an attempt to gain greater
international consideration and frustration at the lack
of progress towards nuclear disarmament by the nuclear
weapon states.
The
government followed its tests with policy announcements
including the report on " Indian nuclear doctrine" released
by India 's National Security Advisory Board in August
1999. These hold that:
.
India would not be the first to use nuclear weapons and
would support a treaty on non use of nuclear weapons
.
India supports negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition
convention
.
India supports the inclusion of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons as a crime in the Statute of the International
Criminal Court
India
had initially proposed negotiations for a Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, but in 1996 opposed its conclusion
on the grounds that it allowed sub-critical explosions
and other high-tech nuclear weapons experiments and
was no longer a step towards nuclear disarmament.
See:
India 's Nuclear Doctrine and Policy , G.Kanwal,
www.idsa-india.org/an-feb1-01.html
For
more information see our issues page
Pakistan
"Nuclear
weapons must be banned and eliminated just as chemical
and biological weapons have been prohibited."
M.
Siddique Khan Kanju Minister for Foreign Affairs Pakistan
July 1998
Pakistan
is believed to have been developing a nuclear capability
since the early 1970s. In May 1998, Pakistan responded
to India 's nuclear tests by testing a series of nuclear
weapons and declaring itself a nuclear weapon power.
Pakistan 's quest for a nuclear deterrent has been motivated
principally by fears of domination by India . The ongoing
conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has
further fueled this fear, and provided an unstable environment
which makes the deployment of nuclear weapons in the
region extremely dangerous.
Pakistan
, like India , has supported comprehensive disarmament
proposals at the United Nations and Conference on Disarmament,
but did not join the CTBT for similar reasons as India.
Pakistan has proposed a number of bilateral or regional
initiatives which India has not supported. These include
a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia
and joining the NPT. India opposes these on the grounds
that they do not address the nuclear threat India faces
from China and the other NWS. Pakistan and India have
concluded a number of bilateral confidence building
measures including a hot-line agreement and an agreement
not to attack each other's nuclear power facilities.
See:
Pakistan
's Nuclear Descent , Zia Mian www.inesap.org/bulletin16/bul16art03.htm
For
more information see our issues page
Israel
"Give
me peace and we will give up the atom. If we achieve
regional peace, I think we can make the Middle East
free from any nuclear threat."
Israeli
Prime Minister Shimon Peres
December
1995
Israel
does not officially acknowledge that it has nuclear weapons
but is believed to have been developing a nuclear weapons
program since the mid 1950s, with technical support from
France and possibly the US . In October 1986, the Sunday
Times published details of Israel 's undeclared nuclear
programme, based on information and photographs supplied
by Mordechai Vanunu, who had worked as a nuclear technician
at Israel 's secret Dimona complex. Israel
's nuclear policy is related to its relationships with
its Arab neighbours. It includes policies of deterrence
to prevent conventional attacks or those with weapons
of mass destruction, as well as the "Samson option"
of nuclear use following outbreak of war in order to
ensure the survival of the state.
Israel
has joined the CTBT but not the NPT. It is not opposed
to negotiations on nuclear disarmament, but links its
participation to these with progress on peace in the
Middle East .
Israel
also has concerns about verification provisions of arms
control treaties, believing that these can be too intrusive
and detrimental to intelligence security particularly
in geographically small states.
For
more information see our issues page
Two
sides of deterrence |
US
Policy and Military Doctrine
Our
national policy is first and foremost to deter
aggression by means of a strong nuclear and
conventional capability. If deterrence fails,
forces must be prepared to end the conflict
on favorable terms to the United
States , its interests and its allies.
The purpose of using nuclear weapons can range
from producing a political decision to influencing
an operation.
Nuclear
weapons should change the perceptions of the
enemy leaders about the ability to win, demonstrate
to enemy leaders that loss outweighs their
potential gain, achieve prompt resolution
of the conflict, preclude the enemy from achieving
its objectives, ensure success of the
effort by US and multinational forces, and
counter enemy weapons of mass destruction.
Doctrine
for Joint Theatre Nuclear Operations, US Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 1996
|
An
old thesis
Deterrence
is an old thesis that has been resurrected
and is being recycled with added local flavor.
Flaw
Number One is that it presumes a complete,
sophisticated understanding of the psychology
of your enemy. It assumes that what deters
you (the fear of annihilation) will deter
them. What about those who are not deterred
by that? The suicide bomber psyche--the "We'll
take you with us" school-
Flaw
Number Two is that Deterrence is premised
on fear... It is not some inherent, mystical
attribute of nuclear bombs that they automatically
inspire thoughts of peace. On the contrary,
it is the endless, tireless, confrontational
work of people who have had the courage to
openly denounce them, the marches, the demonstrations,
the films, the outrage--that is what has averted,
or perhaps only postponed nuclear war
.
Arundhati
Roy, The End of Imagination, 1998
|
See
also North Korean Nuclear Doctrine
|