on antimissile defence: the implications for European industry

The Assembly,

1. Recalling that the implications of antimissile defence for European industry come under the responsibility of the Council, as the custodian of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, and fall within the purview of WEAG, which remains part of WEU, and that these issues cannot therefore be left exclusively to the Atlantic Alliance or the European Union;
2. Noting with satisfaction the new position of the United States Administration in favour of a discussion with its friends and allies on the deployment of an antimissile system whose title, moreover, it has changed from "National Missile Defense" to simply "Missile Defense";
3. Considering that Europe perceives its security as continuing to be guaranteed mainly by agreements on disarmament and armaments control, in particular the ABM Treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems;
4. Taking the view that any revision or abrogation of that Treaty can only come about as the result of a consensus between the United States and Russia, as signatory states;
5. Welcoming in this connection the meeting of minds between the United States and Russia during recent talks between the Presidents of both countries;
6. Considering that it would be desirable for China to be involved in any future agreement and with that perspective in mind for that country and Europe to draw closer together on antimissile defence;
7. Recalling that the non-military use of space must continue to be an essential aim for all countries;
8. Stressing the need for Europe to acquire a European missile defence capability that is compatible with the ABM Treaty, for the protection of its forces during operations;
9. Recalling the proposals Russia has made to NATO for, on the one hand, a non-strategic pan-European missile defence system (Euro-ABM) and on the other hand, cooperation in the field of satellites;
10. Noting, furthermore, that Japan is also developing a theatre missile defence system with a naval component similar to the American Navy Theater Wide system;
11. Taking into account also the NATO feasibility study on a theatre missile defence system, currently in the invitation-to-tender phase;
12. Taking into account the discussions that have started at industrial level between Israel and the United States on possible cooperation in the field of BPI (boost phase interception of missiles);
13. Noting that, notwithstanding the considerable political as well as technical differences between the American and European analyses of antimissile defence, there are nevertheless areas of agreement, in particular in the field of terminal defences and early warning satellites;
14. Recalling in that connection, among other examples of transatlantic industrial cooperation, the MEADS programme being conducted as a cooperative venture by Italy, Germany and the United States, as well as the industrial partnership involving EADS, Lockheed Martin and Boeing for a study of the NATO tactical antiballistic missile system;
15. Emphasising that current antimissile defence studies involving Europeans focus on theatre missile defence and in most cases are being conducted in cooperation with the United States;
16. Welcoming the major rationalisation and restructuring effort made by the European defence industry over the last decade, enabling it to face the future in circumstances similar to those of its American competitors;
17. Considering that the development of a European defence industry, particularly in the field of antimissile defence, is both the consequence of the setting-up of a European defence and a prerequisite for it, and that the prospects for the industry's future development are, to a large extent, interlinked with it;
18. Considering, finally, that the implications for European industry of possible participation in a missile defence system can only be evaluated once the United States and Russia have decided on the systems they wish to develop and propose to the European states,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Task WEAG to assess the implications for European industry of an antimissile defence system, with the aim of drawing up a European R&D programme for the purpose of demonstrating Europe's technical and industrial capacities in this field, taking into account the following factors:

1. a future European antimissile defence strategy could be based on an architecture consisting of a first line of defence composed of land-based, naval or air-based BPI (boost phase interception) systems deployed in Turkey and the Black Sea, a second line of defence composed of naval TMD systems deployed in the eastern Mediterranean and a third line of defence composed of sea- or land-based TMD platforms for the terminal defence of ports and towns;
2. terminal defence and early warning systems would offer synergy with both American missile defence systems and the European Security and Defence Policy, and with satellite warning systems it would be possible to pool technologies and data among the United States, Europe and Russia;
3. it would make sense to establish an architecture reflecting the specificities of each country and allowing a differentiated approach, in other words a sharing of tasks, the United States taking responsibility, for example, for intercepting missiles during the boost phase and mid-course, while the Europeans would be responsible for terminal defence;
4. that division of responsibilities should take place at both operational and, of course, financial level;
5. a number of cooperation programmes are already under way, but further in-depth industrial cooperation should be envisaged.

   Adopted December 2001