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A4-0054/1995
Resolution on the Conference on the Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995
The European Parliament,
- having regard to its resolutions of 11 March 1993 on stopping nuclear tests by the nuclear powers(1), of 24 June 1993 on the moratoria on
nuclear testing(2), of 21 April 1994 on energy priorities in the revised Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)(3), of 29 September 1994 on illegal
trafficking in nuclear materials(4) and of 17 November 1994 on nuclear testing and the UN General Assembly's debate on disarmament(5),
- having regard to the results of the four conferences held in 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 to revise the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
- having regard to the conclusions of the Corfu European Council and to the Council Decision of 25 July 1994 concerning the joint action
adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union regarding preparation for the 1995 Conference of the States
parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(6), with a view to bringing about the indefinite and unconditional extension
of that Treaty,
- having regard to the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament entitled 'The illicit traffic in radioactive
substances and nuclear materials', COM(94)0383 - C4-0227/94,
- having regard to Rule 148 of its Rules of Procedure,
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy and the opinion of the Committee on Research,
Technological Development and Energy (A4-0054/1995),
A. whereas the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which entered into force on 5 March 1970 is due in accordance with Article X for indefinite or
periodic renewal after 25 years, and whereas the Contracting Parties have to take a majority decision on this matter in 1995,
B. whereas a considerable number of the Contracting Parties, particularly those from the Third World, have expressed scepticism regarding the
indefinite extension of the NPT, principally on the grounds that the Treaty discriminates against non-nuclear States, that it offers inadequate
protection against nuclear proliferation and in particular that the nuclear powers have failed to meet their obligations under the NPT (in
particular Art. IV and Art. VI thereof),
C. whereas the concluding document of the 1985 NPT Review Conference called on the UN Conference on Disarmament (Geneva) to proceed to
early multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament; whereas this mandate has never been fulfilled,
D. whereas the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles represents a growing threat to world peace and whereas, in
spite of repeated efforts to curb proliferation and some partial successes in limiting the number of States possessing nuclear weapons, it has not
been possible to restrict the overall expansion of know-how and the capacity to manufacture such weapons, with even States parties to the
NPT, such as Iraq and North Korea, having moved towards the possession of nuclear weapons,
E. firmly believing that the Middle-East peace process should lead to the establishment of a zone which is free from weapons of mass
destruction - an objective to which all the countries in the region should commit themselves,
F. whereas a great number of Contracting States to the NPT consider that the nuclear powers have not adequately complied with their
obligations under the Treaty,
G. convinced that agreement on an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT will only have credibility when certain elements have
been fulfilled by the nuclear powers,
H. whereas there are several non-contracting states which are "de facto" nuclear military states,
I. whereas the indefinite and unconditional option is not necessarily the one which puts more political pressure on current non-contracting
parties to join, particularly those which are nuclear military states,
J. concerned that the NPT negotiations could reach a stalemate, particularly if the negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
also fail to make any progress,
K. having regard to the particular importance which energy considerations will acquire in the future guarantee system, namely the importance to
both the guarantee policy and the energy policy of converting nuclear warheads into fuel for nuclear power stations in view of the fact that, in
the former Soviet Union alone, between 27,000 and 30,000 tactical and strategic nuclear weapons are in storage;
L. convinced that, in spite of all its problems and shortcomings, the NPT represents the main pillar in efforts by the international community to
prevent nuclear proliferation,
M. whereas the changed political situation since 1990 regarding the dangers of nuclear proliferation has meant that many supervisory
mechanisms have disappeared and whereas the range of ballistic missiles has increased to an alarming level,
N. stressing that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an essential aim with a view to achieving an indefinite and unconditional
extension of the NPT,
O. regretting that the two EU nuclear powers, France and the UK, have not as yet publicly expressed the same degree of support in the Geneva
CTBT talks for concluding such a Treaty as has, for example, the USA,
P. disturbed at the nuclear tests still being carried out by the People's Republic of China in disregard of the international moratoria, in spite of
the Chinese Foreign Minister's assertion that his government is in favour of signing a nuclear test ban treaty,
1. Supports the option of indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT;
2. Calls on the States Parties to the NPT, in particular the Member States of the European Union and the nuclear powers, to fulfil the elements
listed below so as to permit the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT at the New York Conference;
3. Calls on the Member States of the European Union to put every effort into bringing about the speediest possible conclusion of a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Geneva Conference, and to take a joint action to this end under Article J.3 TEU;
4. Calls on the Member States of the European Union, pending the abovementioned joint action, expressly to refrain from any nuclear testing;
5. Calls on all nuclear powers to fulfil their obligations under Article VI of the NPT and to agree on a timetable and funding plan to this end;
6. Calls on the Member States of the European Union to take an initiative for a negotiation in the UN Conference on Disarmament for a nuclear
weapons convention leading to global nuclear disarmament as stated in the objectives of Article VI of the NPT;
7. Calls for a ban on the production of fissile material usable for military purposes; supports the call for the creation of an international office to
control plutonium and highly enriched uranium and requests the Council to take a joint action to this end under Article J.3 TEU;
8. Supports the calls by those States Parties to the NPT which possess neither their own military nuclear capability nor any appropriate
protection in the form of a military alliance, for stronger guarantees of security through effective action to uphold respect for international law
and the provisions of the UN Charter against aggression;
9. Endorses the draft resolution submitted by Russia, on behalf of the five major nuclear powers, to the UN Security Council, under the terms of
which those powers undertake to offer guarantees to the non-nuclear states which have signed the NPT in the event of aggression against
them;
10. Calls on the nuclear powers to give a general and mutual undertaking, in the context of the provisions of the NPT, to refrain from using
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states;
11. Calls for all NPT Contracting Parties to comply with the provisions of Article IV of the NPT on cooperation aimed at the development of
non-nuclear sustainable energy on the territory of those Contracting States which wish it, including a guarantee of effective supervision of 'dual
use' goods;
12. Suggests that the Joint Research Centre should be involved in and should contribute to the CAPRA programme for the reduction of
actinides and spent plutonium;
13. Calls for all NPT Contracting Parties to stimulate international cooperation on the development of alternative and sustainable energy
sources as a more promising strategy in order to meet the energy needs of all Contracting Parties, and calls in particular on the Member States of
the European Union to initiate cooperation measures in this area with the other Contracting Parties;
14. Calls for the Community position adopted at the negotiating table to promote all the aims of the NPT by means of stronger legal and
diplomatic measures which can be relied upon to prevent proliferation and, at the same time, by giving a strong boost to effective nuclear
disarmament carried out under international supervision, as provided for in Article VI of the Treaty; also calls for the Community's position to
include, for this purpose, the establishment of a comprehensive international system for monitoring the entire cycle undergone by uranium,
plutonium and, possibly, thorium for civilian uses, including materials derived from the military cycle as a result of the partial dismantling of
nuclear stockpiles, with particular provisions relating to tritium;
15. Calls on the participants in the Conference to provide for unequivocal sanctions to punish failure to comply with the provisions of the
Treaty;
16. Considers that effective sanctions must be imposed, under the auspices of the UN, against Parties to the NPT who can be shown to have
breached its provisions (such as Iraq and North Korea in the past), as well as against other States producing nuclear weapons apparently with a
view to hostilities or blackmail;
17. Calls on the international community to create the legal conditions for the criminal prosecution of offences in connection with illicit nuclear
proliferation, including the illicit traffic in radioactive substances and nuclear materials;
18. Stresses the need for the fullest cooperation between states acceding to the NPT to prevent terrorist organizations, including fanatical
religious sects, from acquiring weapons of mass destruction;
19. Advocates the strengthening and rationalisation of international safeguards and resolves to pursue this matter further, to include:
- coordination of safeguards procedures through independent assessment of safeguard technologies, as applied by Euratom and the
International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna (IAEA) to large bulk handling facilities - reprocessing plants, enrichment plants and fabrication
plants,
- challenge inspections, not announced in advance and backed up by an effective sanctions regime,
- an integrated and coordinated EU licensing system, ranging from dual-use equipment, spare parts etc. at the beginning of the cycle, to nuclear
technology and fissile material at the end,
- acceptance of full-scope safeguards on all nuclear facilities,
- application of full-scope safeguards, if shown effective, without discrimination to all nuclear facilities within EU Member States, and denying
transfers of nuclear facilities and materials to nations which do not accept full-scope safeguards;
20. Calls on the participants in the Conference, particularly the Member States of the European Union, to ensure that the IAEA is given a firm
financial basis and sufficient staff to carry out its monitoring tasks;
21. Supports the IAEA's proposal for the introduction of environmental monitoring and other methods of verification proposed in the IAEA
93+2 process;
22. Calls for the Community position to include all the considerations set out in its abovementioned resolution of 21 April 1994 and for the
negotiations to be concerned with improving the existing guarantee system so that it incorporates the multilateral balance required to eliminate
discrimination between countries regarded as nuclear powers and those without weapons in accordance with the terms defined in the NPT;
23. Hopes that all those states which have not as yet concluded a full-scope safeguard agreement with the IAEA will do so; and calls for the
investigation of the smuggling of fissile material from guarded Euratom facilities to be stepped up;
24. Calls for the nuclear powers to open all their own nuclear facilities to inspection by the IAEA;
25. Supports the establishment of a nuclear weapons register at the UN and calls on the Member States of the European Union to take an
initiative to propose such a register during the NPT review conference;
26. Calls on all states which have not in the past participated in the NPT to accede to the Treaty, and calls on the European Union and its
Member States to develop a policy aimed at reducing tensions in sensitive regions and at meeting the security concerns of nuclear threshold
countries if they agree to join the Treaty;
27. Calls for the European Union, on the basis of Article VII of the NPT, to lead a political initiative to promote regional solutions under which,
in addition to the setting up of denuclearized zones covering the entire globe and the permanent removal of the nuclear threat, realistic solutions
would be drawn up to meet the energy requirements of the areas in question, the necessary technology transfers would be facilitated, checks on
the use of dual techniques would be stepped up and the use of detection methods and the investigation of any major secret programmes would
be promoted;
28. Welcomes the decision by Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine to join the NPT as nuclear-weapons-free states, and calls on the Member States
of the European Union to honour these decisions, with their costly consequences for the states concerned, by appropriate aid and
compensation measures;
29. Stresses, in this context, the importance of ensuring the employment of former Soviet military nuclear scientists for civil purposes and urges
the EU to be ready to contribute to this end;
30. Welcomes South Africa's exemplary decision to do away with its nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT;
31. Urges the participants in the conference to do their utmost to avoid a 'temporary solution' with uncertain consequences for the entire
international community;
32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Governments and Parliaments of the Member States,
the President of the UN General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the UN, the chairman of the UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva and
the Secretariat of the New York Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(1)OJ C 115, 26.04.1993, p. 158.
(2)OJ C 194, 19.07.1993, p. 206.
(3)OJ C 128, 9.5.1994, p. 378.
(4)OJ C 305, 31.10.1994, p. 78.
(5)OJ C 341, 5.12.1994, p. 178.
(6)OJ L 205, 8.8.1994, p. 1.
Source:
http://www3.europarl.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/pv2?PRG=DOCPV&APP=PV2&LANGUE=EN&SDOCTA=4&TXTLST=1&POS=1&Type_Doc=RESOL&TPV=PROV&DATE=050495&PrgPrev=PRG@TITRE|APP@PV2|TYPEF@TITRE|YEAR@95|Find@%70%72%6f%6c%69%66%65%72%61%74%69%6f%6e%20%74%72%65%61%74%79|FILE@BIBLIO95|NBR01@0|NBR00@1|NBR99@0|NBR98@0|NBR97@1|NBR96@0|NBR95@1|NBR94@NULL|PREV@96|ALL@yes|PLAGE@1&TYPEF=TITRE&NUMB=1&DATEF=950405 8 November, 2001
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