on European anti-missile defence: a role for Russia

The Assembly,

1. Recalling that the issue of anti-missile defence falls within Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty for which the Council of WEU retains full responsibility;
2. Recalling the reply of the Council to Assembly Resolution 103 on the United States National Missile Defence programme whereby the Council, whilst agreeing with the Assembly on the importance of this subject, informed the Assembly that it was not, nor foreseen to be, on the agenda of any of its forthcoming meetings;
3. Judging unacceptable an identical reply from the Council to Recommendation 680 on transatlantic cooperation on anti-missile defence, supplemented by a statement confirming the lesser importance of the subject given that the results of the WEU Marseilles ministerial meeting drew the consequences of ESDP developments for WEU and its future structure, as from 1 July 2001 at the latest;
4. Taking account of the speech made by President Bush on 1 May 2001 explaining the American position on missile defence;
5. Considering the proposal made by the Russian Defence Minister, Mr Sergeyev, to NATO on the subject of a pan-European non-strategic anti-missile defence system which could serve as a framework for global cooperation between the Alliance and Russia and also between Russia and Europeans;
6. Noting that the proposal seeks to marry technical and military cooperation with a form of political association, thus making it deserving of particular attention by both NATO and WEU;
7. Considering that the classic trade-off between offensive deterrence and mutual vulnerability among responsible nuclear powers has been seriously modified and that the emergence of new nuclear players and the proliferation of ballistic missile systems that goes with it raises new difficulties that are in the first instance military and then political;
8. Deeming that in the United States such proliferation has gone hand in hand with a complete rethink of defence doctrines in that the concept of shared vulnerability has given way to one of global protection;
9. Noting that the coexistence of these two factors suggests that the present state of affairs as regards deterrence may in essence be defined as transitory and that we are heading towards a mixed arrangement combining offensive and defensive systems;
10. Noting that Europe has not yet gone far enough in making the full doctrinal adjustment required to take these new circumstances on board;
11. Taking the view that Europe perceives its security being maintained by the presence of nuclear arsenals as a potential recourse against any nuclear or chemical strike and through the perpetuation of disarmament and control agreements, especially the ABM Treaty;
12. Considering that Europe should be aware of the need to work towards increased protection from ballistic threats, without restricting itself to ad hoc anti-missile capabilities, explicitly directed against air-breathing launchers, very short-range missiles or antiquated Scud family ballistic systems;
13. Stressing that the launch of such programmes is a major political decision that implies an assessment of the threat and above all public identification of potential enemies, a process that has been avoided to date as most European governments are unwilling to name their adversaries and take preventive measures;
14. Noting that the partial reform of the ABM Treaty has meant giving greater latitude to tactical anti-missile weapons deployments and to the alleviation of constraints on the development of strategic anti-missile weapons;
15. Noting furthermore that the majority of ATBM systems based on the coordinated operation of a series of mobile launchers/interceptors, radar surveillance and launch control units and associated C3I 12 network, and that optimisation of the performance of such systems requires early warning and trajectography satellites, together with communications and data management systems;
16. Highlighting the importance of this last question as regards early warning satellites, if one considers that transatlantic cooperation, especially within NATO, has up until now excluded Europe from the field of military space-based detection;
17. Bearing in mind that Mr Sergeyev's proposal to NATO envisages in detail the possibility of cooperating in the satellite field, referring to the creation of a joint space centre initially to identify and track ballistic missiles and ultimately to intercept non-strategic missiles;
18. Considering that the essentially political nature of the Russian Defence Minister's proposal suggests that Russia is legitimately laying claim to a major role in developing the continent's security policy;
19. Emphasising the fact that the proposal tacitly acknowledges this and stresses the need for a definition and joint assessment of ballistic threats, possible areas of intervention for the Euro-ABM and the development of a European non-strategic anti-missile concept;
20. Recalling the fundamental importance of compliance with the different control and non-proliferation regimes;
21. Stressing, finally, that non-militarisation of space should continue to be a paramount aim of all nations;
22. Recalling that the lack of a European position in regard to US and Russian plans could lead to a situation where the United States and Russia reached a bilateral agreement and Europe was faced with a fait accompli ,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Develop in the broad forum of strategic reflection involving the 28 countries a common position on European anti-missile defence, based on a joint assessment and definition of ballistic threats and on the development of a European non-strategic anti-missile concept that harmonises the American anti-missile programme, the Russian proposal on a Euro-ABM and European interests in that area, and that it submit that position to the Alliance;
2. Use the WEAG framework to evaluate the impact of an anti-missile defence on European industry, taking into account:
   • that European technological and industrial capabilities will be duly incorporated into any joint system;
   • that Europe must have an autonomous early warning system as envisaged in WEU's Noordwijk Declaration;
3. Inform the Assembly, on the basis of Articles IV and V of the modified Brussels Treaty, of any NATO activities in relation to:
   • undertaking a study on the risks and threats of proliferation to European security;
   • efforts to improve instruments used in the fight against proliferation;
   • debate(s) on the American anti-missile programme;
   • possible involvement of Europeans in such a programme from a technological, industrial and financial angle;
   • evaluation of the proposal made to NATO by the Russian authorities for the creation of a pan-European non-strategic anti-missile defence;
   • evaluation of the Russian offer to create a joint space centre for the purposes of identifying and monitoring ballistic launches and intercepting non-strategic launches;
4. Urge, through a joint approach by all WEU member countries in NATO to both the United States and Russia, that no arrangement in this connection discussed between them on a bilateral basis which affects currently accepted strategic doctrine will be concluded without consultation and the involvement of those European allies that so wish.