The Assembly,
1. Conscious that reducing the global nuclear stockpile and maintaining its security has been one of the most challenging undertakings of the post-Cold War period;
2. Recognising that arms control and co-operative security agreements between the United States and the Newly Independent States (NIS) have substantially reduced an enormous arsenal and, in particular, helped deactivate more than 5,000 nuclear warheads so far;
3. Aware that, despite considerable efforts, mainly by the United States and Russia, much remains to be done to protect, secure and dispose of weapons and weapons-usable material in the countries of the former Soviet Union;
4. Concerned that Russia, because of its economic situation, cannot afford to protect adequately some of the sites where weapons-grade fissile material and weapons technologies are located, or improve the security of other military and civilian nuclear installations;
5. Convinced that the possible theft or diversion of nuclear materials or other weapons technologies from the NIS, by either state or non-state actors, is the most pressing proliferation threat to the Alliance;
6. Worried that terrorists or states of concern taking advantage of the poor security conditions at some sites might illegally acquire nuclear material or other weapons technologies;
7. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
a. to devise a set of enhanced responses to face these urgent security challenges in co-operation with Russia and all the allied countries equally concerned by the threats;
b. to assist Russia in identifying, tagging and sealing all its warheads as part of a reliable accounting system, as well as upgrading the protection measures of the 123 nuclear weapon storages selected by the Russian government;
c. to consolidate Russian and other NIS fissile material at fewer sites and implement both the 1993 Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Agreement and the 1997 Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement;
d. to help Russia eliminate up to 100 tons of plutonium by the best technical means available;
e. to help Russia and other NIS strengthen the existing programmes to improve nuclear installations personnel social conditions and reliability;
f. to launch additional initiatives and finance existing programmes to help Russia dismantle out of service nuclear submarines (especially SSNs) and improve spent naval fuel storage facilities and protection measures;
g. to strongly urge Russians to prohibit the sale of nuclear submarines and related technologies to foreign countries;
h. to discourage the Russian President and State Duma from putting into effect the scheme for importing and eventually reprocessing 20,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel;
i. to encourage the United States and Russia to reaffirm in a joint statement their commitment to the 1991-92 informal regime on tactical nuclear weapons or to sign an agreement to that effect;
j. to discourage the Bush Administration from reducing the total budget for Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation and other important co-operative security programmes in 2002;
k. to encourage European NATO Allies and the European Union to step up their diplomatic, financial and technical contribution to securing fissile material, combating illicit traffic, assisting scientists and technical personnel;
l. to improve international sharing of intelligence regarding nuclear material smuggling and terrorist groups interested in weapons of mass destruction.
© NATO Parliamentary Assembly
Source: http://www.nato-pa.int/publications/resolutions/01-ottawa-313.html
10 February 2002 |
