Senate of Canada Debate: Motion to Urge Nuclear Weapons States to Take Weapons Off
Alert Status-Debate Adjourned

Debates of the Senate (Hansard)
1st Session, 36th Parliament,
Volume 137, Issue 158
Tuesday, September 14, 1999
The Honourable Gildas L. Molgat, Speaker

Nuclear Arms
Motion to Urge Nuclear Weapons States to Take Weapons Off Alert
Status-Debate Adjourned
Hon. Douglas Roche, pursuant to notice of September 7, 1999, moved:
That the Senate recommends that the Government of Canada urge the nuclear
weapons states plus India, Pakistan and Israel to take all of their nuclear
forces off alert status as soon as possible.

He said: Honourable senators, the prestigious journal Scientific American
recently reported that on January 25, 1995 military technicians at a handful
of radar stations across northern Russia saw a troubling blip suddenly
appear on their screens. A rocket, launched from somewhere off the coast of
Norway, was rising rapidly through the night sky. Well aware that a single
missile from a U.S. submarine plying those waters could scatter eight
nuclear bombs over Moscow within 15 minutes, the radar operators immediately
alerted their superiors.
The message passed swiftly from Russian military authorities to President
Boris Yeltsin, who, holding the electronic case that could order the firing
of nuclear missiles in response, hurriedly conferred by telephone with his
top advisors. For the first time ever, that nuclear briefcase was activated
for emergency use.
(1420)
For a few tense minutes, the trajectory of the mysterious rocket remained
unknown to the worried Russian officials. Anxiety mounted when the
separation of multiple rocket stages created an impression of a possible
attack by several missiles. However, the radar crews continued to track
their targets. After about eight minutes, senior military officers
determined that the rocket was headed far out to sea and posed no threat to
Russia.
The unidentified rocket in this case turned out to be a U.S. scientific
probe, sent up to investigate the northern lights. Weeks earlier, the
Norwegians had duly informed Russian authorities of the planned launch from
the offshore island of Andoya, but somehow word of the high altitude
experiment had not reached the right ears. That frightening incident,
according to Scientific American, aptly demonstrates the danger of
maintaining nuclear arsenals in a state of hair-trigger alert.
Doing so heightens the possibility that one day someone will mistakenly
launch nuclear missiles, either because of a technical failure or a human
error. A mistake made, perhaps, in the rush to respond to false indications
of an attack.
The Norway incident was not an isolated one. The U.S.-based Centre for
Defense Information reported this month that in the years 1977 to 1984, a
total of 20,784 false warning nuclear indications, most of them minor, were
processed.
Last March, appearing before a joint meeting of Senate and House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committees, General Lee Butler, former commander-in-chief of
the U.S. strategic command, said that upon receiving confirmation of an
impending attack, the U.S. president would have only 12 minutes to decide
whether to retaliate.
Both the U.S. and Russian military have long instituted procedures to
prevent an accident from happening. However, their equipment is not
foolproof. Russia's early-warning and nuclear command systems are
deteriorating. The safety of all other nuclear weapons systems, in
particular, those of India and Pakistan, is even less reliable. All told,
there are 5,000 nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert status, meaning they
could be fired within minutes. The fate of humanity must not hang by such a
slender thread.
Thus, a movement is building up around the world to de-alert all nuclear
weapons. This would be done by the physical separation of the warheads from
the delivery vehicles. That is the intent of the motion I respectfully
submit to the Senate. It reads:
That the Senate recommends that the Government of Canada urge the nuclear
weapons states plus India, Pakistan and Israel to take all of their nuclear
forces off alert status as soon as possible.
Honourable senators will recognize that the motion is narrowly drawn. The
subject of nuclear weapons is huge and complex. The abolition of nuclear
weapons, for which I stand, entails a lengthy debate, but de-alerting is
precise and sharply focused and can be done immediately under conditions of
mutual verifiability. It must be done in order to prevent a calamity
occurring through human error, system failure, irrational acts, or by the
simple working of the laws of chance.
Some may interpret this motion as connected to the famous Y2K problem, which
deals with the ability of computers to properly interpret the correct date
change when the year 2000 arrives. It is true that the failure of computers
to recognize the year 2000 could infect the command, control, communication
and intelligence systems of nuclear forces. There may or may not be a
problem on New Year's Eve, at midnight.
However, Russia and the U.S. are sufficiently concerned about this that they
intend to establish a joint centre in the United States which would seat a
handful of U.S. and Russian officers side-by-side for a few days during the
2000 date switch to monitor blips on nuclear screens. The officers would be
in direct touch with their respective national command authorities to
alleviate any concern about blips that may occur on the date change. Key
United States senators have called for the inclusion of China, India and
Pakistan in this early warning centre, so concerned are they that
ill-prepared computers may malfunction.
This response to a potential problem is clearly inadequate. The year 2000
date change merely highlights the existing danger to the world because of
the alert status of nuclear forces. The world needs the safety that
de-alerting would ensure, not just on New Year's Eve but throughout every
day of every year.
Honourable senators, in short, the argument as put forth by the Canberra
commission of international experts is that the practice of maintaining
nuclear-tipped missiles on alert must be ended because: It is a highly
regrettable perpetuation of Cold War attitudes and assumptions; it
needlessly sustains the risk of hair-trigger postures; it retards the
critical process of normalizing U.S.-Russian relations; it sends the
unmistakable and, from an arms control perspective, severely damaging
message that nuclear weapons serve a vital security role; it is entirely
inappropriate to the extraordinary transformation in the international
security environment.
Honourable senators, terminating nuclear alert would do the following:
reduce dramatically the chance of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear
weapons launch; have a positive influence on the political climate among the
nuclear weapons states; and it would help set the stage for intensified
cooperation.
The Canberra commission concluded that taking nuclear forces off alert could
be verified by national technical means and nuclear weapon state inspection
arrangements. De-alerting has a wide basis of support. The Government of
Canada is in favour, and has expressed its support in a formal response to
the report on nuclear weapons of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs
and International Trade. Therefore, this motion falls within government
policy.
The U.K. government recently relaxed a notice to fire its nuclear weapons
from minutes to days. Resolutions of the UN General Assembly have urged
de-alerting.
The chairman's report of the three-year preparatory process for the 2000
review of the non-proliferation treaty calls for de-alerting to prevent
accidental or unauthorized launches.
Friends of the Earth, in Sydney, Australia, have obtained the support of 380
organizations around the world for de-alerting.
Honourable senators, a few years ago I went back to Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
the two cities in Japan that suffered atomic bomb attack. I have seen these
sites several times. Each time, it is a profound experience in understanding
the destructive power of nuclear weapons.
Accidental nuclear war remains an immense treat to humanity today. We can
help to lessen that threat. I commend this motion, honourable senators, for
your consideration.
Hon. John. B. Stewart: Honourable senators, I should like to ask Senator
Roche a question.
He has made a persuasive speech and my question is: Given the plausibility
of the argument he advances, why is it that the nuclear weapons states plus
India, Pakistan and Israel, have not already taken their nuclear forces off
alert status? Is there some argument, or is it recalcitrance among one or
more of the states?
Senator Roche: I thank the Honourable Senator Stewart for that question.
The main reason that the principal nuclear weapons states, led by the United
States and Russia, along with the U.K., France and China, have not
de-alerted is that nuclear weapons fit into the strategy of nuclear
deterrence. It is argued by some that, by de-alerting, they are taking away
or diminishing the constant status of nuclear deterrence. That argument has
been rebutted. After all, in the case of an emergency or some crisis
happening in international affairs, nuclear weapons could be reactivated.
Therefore, it is for the safety of the major areas of the world that the
de-alerting process, campaign or movement has grown. It is held by
proponents of de-alerting that it is a more important consideration for the
safety of humanity to take weapons off alert status than to preserve nuclear
deterrence as we have known it through the Cold War years.
(1430)
On motion of Senator Carstairs, debate adjourned.
Adjournment
Leave having been given to revert to Government Notices of Motions:
Hon. Sharon Carstairs (Deputy Leader of the Government): Honourable
senators, with leave of the Senate and notwithstanding rule 58(1)( h), I
move:
That when the Senate adjourns today, it do stand adjourned until Tuesday
next, September 21, 1999, at 2 p.m.
The Hon. the Speaker: Is leave granted, honourable senators?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
Motion agreed to.
The Senate adjourned until Tuesday, September 21, 1999, at 2 p.m.