

Paul Quilès
Translated from French by Judith Hitchman

Nuclear Weapons, a French Fib

Reflections on nuclear disarmament

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The author

Paul Quilès was nominated as minister several times over by the French government; his most important ministerial role was as Minister for Defence (1985-1996). He was president of the commission for Defence in the French Parliament (1997-2002); this was followed by holding office as vice-president of the commission for Foreign Affairs (2004-2007). He held national office within the French socialist party, where he was responsible for questions on strategy and defence (1995-2008). He is currently mayor of Cordes-sur-Ciel in the Tarn, and member of the "Mayors for Peace" network. He is a signatory of the Global Zero appeal.

You can read Paul Quilès' blog at : <http://paul.quiles.over-blog.com>

Global Zero is an international movement to ban nuclear weapons. It is supported by 300 prominent figures, and 450,000 citizens around the world:
www.globalzero.org/en

The international network of **Mayors for Peace** was founded by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It has been promoting the culture of peace and nuclear disarmament since 1985. www.afcdrp.com

PREFACE

*Ania Nussbaum, Owen Cabon, and Paul Mouginot*¹ are students, and members of the Global Zero movement

Even though the Berlin Wall fell twenty-two years ago, it has taken the same number of years to breach the wall surrounding the debate on nuclear weapons and the French doctrine of security.

Paul Quilès is one of those politicians who are helping to break down the invisible wall that constitutes the “French fib” that surrounds our stockpile of nuclear weapons. A graduate of the French Polytechnique, he breaks with the French consensus on military nuclear armament. How is possible to turn a deaf ear to the call made by an ex-minister and ex-president of the commission for defence of the French parliament when he queries the very existence for the need for nuclear weapons? At a time of electoral campaign, when commentators and French politicians alike remain silent on this subject, the voice of those who defend the elimination of all nuclear weapons is being raised. It is that of Global Zero.

The debate is quite simply absent from French political life. And what about the sword of Damocles that permanently hangs over our head, or the astronomical sums of money that are allocated to maintaining the French nuclear stockpile at a time of budgetary “austerity” with hardly any discussion? The silence of the government and political leaders is deafening. Whereas the discussion has begun on the civil use of nuclear following the Fukushima catastrophe in Japan, no attention is being paid to the intrinsic crisis of nuclear military weapons. *Cast a blind eye and move on!* The policy of the media that merely focuses on ‘hot’ current affairs, sadly fails to take up long-term stakes.

We believe that given this silence, that there is no shame in launching this debate: it is our duty to do so and to bring the issue to the forefront of the public sphere. Nuclear weapons are not something banal; they are a threat to all humanity. National debate needs to exist, as the stakes are second to none.

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Nuclear weapons as a factor of prestige or as a means of dissuasive power that can guarantee security, is no longer an argument that carries any weight, a slogan that can be repeated *ad infinitum*. Almost half a century since the death of General de Gaulle who still believes in France as an international power, just because they country possesses nuclear bombs? But France clings to the idea, like a fading beauty clinging to the precious remnants of her glory. Let’s stop considering that the bomb is an irrefutable testimony to our past victories. And stop looking back in nostalgia to the time when France dominated the international scene, and believing that our stockpile can help us regain this position.

We often associate nuclear dissuasion and a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations as two signs that situate France in the concert of nations. It is indeed regrettable that both the main candidates in the French presidential elections used this reference, as it is based on approximate history: the French nuclear bomb was built after France had won a seat on the Security Council. In the context of the Cold War, possessing the atomic bomb was synonymous with independent strategic decision-making powers. This was an advantage that General de Gaulle used successfully. The context has nevertheless evolved. Those who look on the bomb as a life insurance policy that guarantees them against possible war-mongering decisions by Iran or North Korea are failing to take an important aspect of the issue into account. These countries may indeed possess nuclear weapons or be in the process of acquiring them, they do not have the means to deploy them: ballistic missiles, aircraft carriers, submarines etc.

But surely the promotion of disarmament gives greater political power than dangerous, expensive weapons? And are we not living a period where economic competitiveness is greater than that of the military? And do the key issues of the 21st century, be it terrorism, global warming or the economic crisis not mean we need to refocus our attention?

In 2009, President Obama made an historical speech, recognising that the United States, as a country that had actually used nuclear weapons (in Hiroshima and Nagasaki) had the responsibility to take the lead in the movement to eliminate nuclear weapons. That same year, the UN Security council voted on a proposed resolution by the American President calling on the international community to strengthen their efforts to achieve this. Even Russia expressed their agreement to participate in the effort, which is indeed

proof that we have entered a new era. The hope for collaboration between the United States and Russia to eliminate atomic weapons has now become a reality.

This hope is clearly expressed in the Report on the global partnership against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related matters presented at the G8 summit in Deauville on the 26th & 27th May 2011. It recalls that in April 2010, the American and Russian governments signed a protocol in which both countries commit to eliminating 34 tonnes of excess military combustible fuel that could be used for manufacturing the equivalent of 17,000 warheads. Over and above the implementation of these agreements, both countries committed to reducing their stockpile of atomic weapons and to implement a new Start Treaty. Yet in spite of these efforts, some countries are continuing to develop their stockpiles, such as the sworn enemies, India and Pakistan.

The French position, contrary to that of the United Nations members, was rational in the context of the Cold War. But changing times call for a change in paradigm. Most NATO countries have fully understood this, and are calling for the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons situated in Europe. And although some may regret the French decline, we are obliged to note that France is hindering any evolution within NATO on this point, although there is no vital threat that can justify maintaining these weapons in Europe.

Our fellow citizens in Europe are not familiar with French strategy in terms of military nuclear armament. There is little public discussion on questions of defence in France. Is this a hangover from the “stay mum” campaign of the Second World War? A desire to hide? The defence of the “higher interests” of our country? We shall not reply to this question. It is, however our duty to inform people. What media mentioned the Franco-British defence treaty that was signed in November 2010? An important part of this treaty is dedicated to shared research and development of a new generation of nuclear submarines as well as a shared effort to develop a new generation of nuclear bombs. This treaty has committed us to disproportionately high investment budgets for several decades to come.

Our parents and grandparents have left us nuclear bombs as our inheritance. We do not wish to further pass this deadly gift on to our own children. We were born in 1990, and we represent the first post-Cold War generation. We

haven't lived through the conflict between the two blocks. And although we are able to understand that our elders are attached to these kinds of weapons, we no longer consider them as rational. We view each and every bomb owned by States as schools that are not built, and medication that is not covered by State Social Security.

Nuclear weapons are an anachronism; they no longer guarantee the balance between two major blocks, they destabilise them. Whereas the United States and Russia are reducing their stockpile, other regions of the world are doing quite the opposite. The fact that the major powers possessed nuclear weapons during the Cold War has created jealousies, and emerging powers and countries with unstable regimes aspire to do the same. We are not blaming them for this. Quite the opposite: their aspirations are legitimate in their position. The only issue in our eyes is that of complete, global disarmament, and the faster this comes about, the better.

This is why we are members of Global Zero, an international movement that advocates the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Some call us utopians. In reality, we are pragmatists. Multilateral elimination of the existing nuclear stockpile is possible thanks to clearly designated stages and regular controls. We do not wish to wait for future generations to take action. We hope to witness the achievement of a new doctrine of international security.

Over and above the insoluble issue of war and peace, we cannot ignore the eschatological threat that weighs on our shoulders if the founding hypothesis of dissuasion - that of the nuclear arms as something not to be used - were to prove false.

Paul Quilès' writing on the nuclear issue truly strengthens our conviction. He will no doubt open the eyes of those who have thus far failed to measure the extent of change that has occurred in our strategic environment over the last twenty years.

1. THE FAKE CONSENSUS¹

“It is possible to prove anything if the words used are not clearly defined”. This quotation by the French philosopher, Alain, casts a rather crude light on certain confrontations that crop up in political life. By avoiding the definition of words and linking them to concepts that are themselves poorly defined, and not stating the context in which they are being used, it is indeed possible to “prove whatever one wants”. This is precisely what happens when we discuss the issues of defence, a major subject in a dangerous, unstable and over-armed world.

In the past, that’s to say before 1989, which is when the Berlin Wall fell, the strategy *par excellence* for nuclear dissuasion was that of the instrument of military balance between East and West. Whether or not it was relevant, is a question that should have been asked as soon as the confrontation between the two blocks came to an end. The state of the risks and threats no longer has anything in common with what it was during the Cold War; the *scenarii* where Russia or China might attack the vital interests of a Western power have, in the present day situation, become highly unlikely. As to the threats grounded in local conflicts, they cannot be countered by the threats of using nuclear weapons, and are therefore relegated to the “blind spots” of dissuasion. Terrorist threats fall into this category.

Nuclear proliferation, on the other hand is one of the main threats to global security in the world. It can be overcome more effectively through multilateralism and treaties than by nuclear dissuasion. The very fact of linking the possession of nuclear weapons to the “status of a major power” as is often the case can incite certain countries to try to enter the game, whereas on the contrary, the objective of the NPT, ratified by almost all UN member States (189), is to move towards an end to nuclear armament.

So how can we repeat in all seriousness that nuclear dissuasion is a sort of “life insurance policy” or that it “guarantees the integrity of our country”? There is actually no discussion on such statements, for the simple reason that there is no public querying of such statements, over and above discussion in

¹ According to an article by Paul Quilès published on the site of *L'Express* (www.lexpress.fr) on January 4th 2012, under the title *Dissuasion nucléaire : vous avez dit consensus ?*

insider circles. We are told that this is all quite normal, as they are the object of consensus. It is all the easier to talk of that well-known consensus, a key word when it comes to the facts, as nobody has ever seriously checked whether it exists, and we do not even know exactly what it covers. And as there has never been any discussion, with prior serious information sharing, not to mention any public consultation of the French public, the circle has thus been squared.

Those who, without being openly against the concept wish to discuss it and examine the relevance of certain choices that have been made are instantly labelled as incompetent, irresponsible and demagogic, even as bad French citizens. And at my own risk and peril of being accused of the same, I wish to clearly state that we should not be afraid of publicly examining these issues, starting as suggested by the philosopher Alain, by clearly defining the meaning of words.

I will take a single example to illustrate my point; that of the “strategic air force” that represents 15% of the French force of dissuasion². In historical terms, they were the first to have been created in 1964, based on the simplicity of their deployment (a Mirage IVA bomber) and the weapon (the AN-11 bomb). Nowadays, two squadrons are on 24/7 nuclear alert, using Rafale F3s or Mirage 2000 K3s and ASMP-A missiles (air-to-ground medium range), that have a range of 500 km if launched at high altitude, or 100 km at low altitude. They carry a nuclear warhead of 100 to 300 kt³!

What is this force supposedly for? We are told in rather obscure words that it

² The main French force of dissuasion is made up of four ballistic missile nuclear submarines. This ocean-faring component enables France to strike an adversary State first, as well as to guarantee warding off their attack. These submarines are currently being modernised and will be equipped with 16 new M51 missiles (they have a range of 9,000 km) and new 100 kt nuclear warheads (SLBMs). That is enough to dissuade any adversary wherever they might be; a strike using a single missile (with a maximum of 6 warheads) would lead to unbelievable destruction, if we just remember the 200,000 deaths caused on Hiroshima by the explosion of a 15kt bomb.

³ Kilotonnes are the units used for measuring the force of atomic explosions; they are equivalent to the explosion of 1,000 tonnes of TNT.

would provide the Head of State¹ with “the alternatives, complementarities and capacities to adapt”, as it would enable the country to be “visible and therefore demonstrative”. In other words, it is a sort of nuclear show of force to intervene prior to what president Sarkozy called a “nuclear warning”. The role of the airborne dimension is to show off and impress the adversary!

To try to gain better understanding of the implications of this, we need to imagine a fleet of nuclear bombers taking off with all the requisite logistics (in-flight refuelling, fighter planes to ward off attackers, data transmission...), then flying around the enemy while all the while diplomatic discussions are taking place, before they finally receive the order to fire²! Over and above this obviously unlikely scenario, it is easy to see that the very existence of the airborne component discredits dissuasion, by suggesting that to get an adversary to back down, the ballistic missile submarines and their missiles are not sufficiently dissuasive!

Furthermore, it is impossible to say against whom this threat could be used, given that the very design implies that it is a geographically short-range weapon. This is not doubt why, given that there are no enemies close enough that are worthy of military interest, the British abandoned the airborne nuclear fleet in 1997, and the Americans have pulled out most of the B-61 bombers that were stationed in Europe.

This example demonstrates that if we want to move away from the official line, that there is indeed room for this discussion; it needs to move beyond the limited framework of a bygone era, and take the positive change of the world into account as well as the new aspirations of the international community.

¹ The decree of January 14th 1964 defines the exclusive role of the president of the French Republic to commit to the use of nuclear weapons.

² A single nuclear strike with a warhead of 300kt would be the equivalent of 20 times greater than Hiroshima.

2. REFLECTIONS ON NUCLEAR DISSUASION¹

Q- In your opinion, what is the point of having nuclear weapons nowadays, and are they still adapted to the new kinds of challenges to security we are facing in the early 21st century?

Paul Quilès :

Several events have marked my life and explain my interest in the questions we are discussing today. My father was an officer, and I was appointed Minister for Defence, and then became president of the Defence Commission, here, in the French Parliament after 2000. Previously, after graduating from Polytechnique I did my military service as an active officer, not far from here in the Ministry of Defence, in the Military Operations Centre. It so happens that I had the advantage, so to speak, of having General de Gaulle on the phone, for the simulation of the first order to engage nuclear weapons. The colonel in charge of the department was intimidated by the idea of talking to the president of the Republic, and preferred a young Polytechnique graduate to take the “risk” of being the go-between in transmitting the order to Taverny. I found the date: it was a few days after the publication of the decree of 14th January 1964 that defined how nuclear dissuasion would operate. Ever since that date, I have borne in mind that it is the president of the Republic, and he alone who decides, in his capacity as the head of the Defence Select Committee.

My second memory is when president Reagan launched his project known as Star Wars, the Strategic Defence Initiative. I was Minister for Defence at that time, and had written a column expressing my opinion in the *Le Monde* newspaper: I was against the project. The Americans invited me to Washington and I met the American Secretary for Defence, and General Abrahamson, who was in charge of the SDI programme. They gave me a tour of the Pentagon underground secret installations, and showed me a film of

¹ Speech given at the Democracy club symposium, November 21st 2011 on the theme “The absence of nuclear armament in political party programmes”.

satellite pictures that tended to prove that the Russians had violated the ABM Treaty of 1972, by installing radars near Krasnoïarsk, to protect Moscow. They therefore considered that this authorised them to launch their huge SDI project, as a shield to protect the whole of the United States. I considered that this project was unrealistic and stupid; it was never implemented, even if there are now smaller versions of it under discussion.

My third memory is of quite a different kind. It is about François Mitterand’s attitude to pre-strategic nuclear weapons. I remember him as a parliamentarian being highly critical of what was then known as the “strike force”. He had held serious discussions with the then Prime Minister, Georges Pompidou, on the decree issued by General de Gaulle that I have previously mentioned, and that linked all our institutions around the presidency (“The indivisible authority of the State is totally delegated to the president of the Republic”). Having himself become president, François Mitterand had accepted the idea of dissuasion and the role of being responsible for nuclear strike action, but he became irritated when it was explained to him that a pre-emptive strike was essential, because it was the weapon of “ultimate warning”. This word is part of the formulæ that users sometimes have trouble in describing: “strict sufficiency”, “life insurance”, “ultimate warning”. But what is an “ultimate warning”?, asked the president. Someone then explained to him that an “ultimate warning” was delivered using Pluto nuclear missiles, followed by Hades missiles, and that the territories that they were aimed at were Eastern Europe, particularly East Germany. This strike, according to those who promoted this line of thought were aimed at proving our resolution to the enemy, to induce fear, and even convince the enemy to back down, by convincing them that we could hit them even harder! This point of view appeared so absurd to François Mitterand that he decided to put a stop to the Hades development in 1991, and ordered the dismantlement of Pluto, even if this only took effect five years later.

After recalling these memories, I shall now address the question you put to me: “Are nuclear weapons adapted to today’s world?” The world is quite obviously different from that of the Cold War, pre-1989. In reality, disarmament had already started before the fall of the Berlin Wall, even if what was going on at that stage was a sort of re-balancing act; in 1985 there were 70,000 nuclear warheads in the world and thanks to the Start 1 and 2

and New Start agreements and the non-proliferation treaty, this was reduced to 22,600 warheads by 2010. This represents the equivalent of 450,000 times the Hiroshima bomb. It demonstrates the extent to which the arms' race has led to absurd situations. There are still 7,560 warheads deployed today. 2,768 of these are in the United States, and 4,630 are in Russia. The dangers are no longer those of the past, and nobody would seriously think that the Western world is under threat of nuclear weapons by Russia or even China. Obviously we do not know what the state of the world will be in twenty or thirty years time... which leads some people to the conclusion that we shall never be totally able to do without nuclear weapons that constitute a sort of "life insurance policy" that needs to be kept up all our lives, and then passed on to our children and future generations.

The fundamental issue is whether nuclear weapons are an inheritance of the past that needs to be preserved, or a vestige of another world of which we should dispose. In this case, how should we do it, and within what timeframe? If, on the other hand we believe that these weapons will never disappear, how can we reduce their numbers and their dangerous nature and, most importantly, how can we avoid their proliferation, which together with international terrorism, is certainly one of the two greatest threats of our times.

Q- The way in which weapons are used is linked to the way we believe they should be used. You state that the world has changed. Is the international nuclear context in the process of changing or not, over and above the issue of proliferation?

Paul Quilès: We need to closely examine what has happened since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and even before it fell. I would like to remind you that negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty began in 1968; the treaty entered into effect in 1970. We must also bear in mind the fact that the five permanent members of the Security Council are not members because they have nuclear weapons, because most of them became members before they had them. This question refers to the notion whereby it is believed that in order to play a key role and be part of the concert of nations, France should have nuclear weapons, and that this guarantees the country a place on the Security Council. The issue of taking this into account in this eminent circle of the realities of today's world, is a totally different kettle of fish. In the past,

there wasn't much talk about Brazil or India, although these countries are about to become one of the most important in the world. Germany was a defeated nation, as was Japan. Our present world has very little in common with that of 1945, and international events have changed again since the fall of the Berlin Wall. I shall therefore limit my analysis to the recent period.

On the 15th of April 2009, President Obama launched an appeal in favour of "a world nuclear weapons'-free world". Some people may believe that this is a simple idea, but that he was not in a position to take any action, and that given the current pre-electoral context in the United States, that the Republicans would stop Obama from going further that his convictions on this issue. If I mention that the Republicans tend to hinder progress on this, it is because they also blocked the treaty of ratification of the total ban on nuclear tests, which the United States are the only State not to have signed.

On September 24th 2009, the UN Security Council passed a resolution stating their "determination to create the conditions for a world nuclear weapons' free world". It is important to note that the highest authority responsible for peacekeeping in the world made that declaration.

On April 6th 2010, President Obama published the NPR (Nuclear Posture Review), the new American doctrine, stating their desire to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the United States defence policy.

On 28th May 2010, the NPT review process, unlike that of 2005 that had been a failure, examined three important issues - disarmament, non-proliferation issues and civilian nuclear power - that were included in the final document. A meeting was also scheduled for 2012, aimed at examining the possibility of creating a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East (NWFZ). Some people say that this is difficult to imagine, but to those who declared in the 1970s that the Berlin Wall would fall would also have probably have been considered as dreamers. Just like those who spoke about the fall of Kadhafi. World progress is made through dreams and ideals that become reality.

Finally, on 5th February 2011 the new Start treaty came into effect. I would like to remind you that the treaty called Start 1 had begun in 1991, two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Start 11 was scheduled to happen in 1993, but was never enforced. The negotiations never even began for Start 111, due to the breach in the ABM treaty by the United States, who wanted to have an anti-missile defence force. The new treaty, called New Start aims to reduce

the number of warheads to 1550 for both Russia and the United States by 2017. This treaty does not impact either the reserves or tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons are only tactical in name, because they are powerful warhead that all have a minimum equivalent of at least 10 times the Hiroshima bomb. They concern Europe, where 200 of these weapons owned by the United States are situated on six bases in five different European countries, and they are a real subject of discussion between NATO partners and between Americans and Russians.

As far as the pre-1989 period is concerned, there was a genuine reduction in nuclear weapons, as well as the will to negotiate, even if there were still substantial difficulties. These are particularly connected to the situation in the United States and the fact that the Russians do not particularly appreciate the idea of developing anti-missile defence, as they say: "If we are not your enemies, we would you install anti-missile defence systems close to our country?"

On another front, the degree of hostility and defiance between the leaders of Pakistan and India has risen, as I witnessed in a recent conference. I would like to remind you that these two countries as well as Israel possess nuclear arms capacity but are not part of the five countries authorised by the NPT to have them. (The professed Nuclear Weapon States). We also need to mention the specific situation of Iran and North Korea. Both these countries are signatories of the non-proliferation treaty and possess or have are in the process of developing nuclear weapons.

In a nutshell: there is a effective reduction in the stockpile of weapons, the varying desire from one country to another to take matters further, but difficulties as to the means of achieving this, other than by the total removal or at least reduction of these nuclear weapons, if indeed they should be totally be done away with.

Q- What do you think of the French doctrine of strict sufficiency? Is it still relevant, or is it outdated?

Paul Quilès : I have never been able to understand what is meant by "strict sufficiency", because if it is sufficient, why add the adjective "strict"? Perhaps this implies that we are not able to define what we mean by sufficient, in which case we are right to question this, as the number of French nuclear

warheads was about 200 in 1975. When I became Minister for Defence in 1986, this had increased to 300. In 1994 it had reached 540 and the president of the Republic is now talking about 300. We can easily see that the notion of strict self-sufficiency has changed over the years! People might answer that we are talking about different equipment, that out of the four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines one always needs to be at sea, that we are talking about different enemies; but what is the truth of this? The official response is "All enemies wishing to attack our vital interests". But what are these vital interests? According to the doctrine, the reply remains vague, and considers that they are not always situated on our territory. They could also be in another country, another continent and we are informed that the president of the Republic could authorise a limited attack that would constitute a nuclear warning.

While these are serious complex issues, they are all too often considered only within limited specialist military, industrial or research circles. There is no genuine debate, even in the Parliament. And as to public opinion, it is just a game, like asking television audiences a question such as "Do you consider nuclear weapons are necessary?" Given the lack of information or any true debate, the replies - yes, no, it depends... - don't really mean very much.

Just to add something on the topic of the military industrial lobby: when I returned from my meeting in Washington, in late 1985, Mr. Jean-Luc Lagardère strongly reproached me on my anti-SDI position, on the grounds that it would cause him to lose important contracts. But should nuclear of security policy be defined by any given industry? I don't believe it should, even if I am aware that lobbying is very present in both the United States and France. I am well aware of how political representatives of the highest level, including those who are said to be above all others are advised on such matters. I am not saying that they are poorly advised; but they are sometimes led into taking quick decisions on the basis of information that cannot always be verified and without holding full discussion.

To summarise, I still do not know what "strict sufficiency" means", and nobody has yet been able to explain to me what the M51 missiles, whose range has been increased from 6,000 to 9,000 km might be used for; is this a means of dissuading China? I would like to understand what these weapons are for; I have heard people boast of their merits for years, but I consider that their development does not conform to article VI of the NPT that France has

signed. I would like to draw your attention to the article that states that “each of the five States in possession of nuclear weapons undertakes to pursue discussions in good faith to work towards nuclear disarmament”. When we modernise in this way, can we say that we are contributing to nuclear disarmament?

Q- If we take the option of nuclear disarmament seriously, - and we know you are in favour of Global Zero - what do we need to do to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, given that it involves an issue of trust we need to have in those who possess them, both officially and unofficially?

Paul Quilès: My first reply would be to underline the importance of the time factor. All talk that says it is possible to envisage the suppression of nuclear weapons in four to five years is rubbish. It doesn't hold water, given the state of the world and the stockpile of nuclear weapons. It would, however, be possible to set a time-line, which is something that some global leaders are doing. Be they ex-secretaries of State or ex-ministers for the Defence, American, British, Russian or Chinese, they all believe that we need to move towards the end of nuclear weapons, not in several years, but according to a time-line that reaches as far as 2030, and that has successive phases.

My second answer is that in order to commit to this process, people need to be convinced that nuclear weapons are of no use, dangerous and costly. There are different opinions on this, and I believe we need to discuss them. I am not satisfied to just read that a world without nuclear weapons could be more dangerous, that nuclear weapons are a form of “life insurance policy”...at least for the five countries that have them. I would also like to remind you that one of the objectives of the NPT, was initially to limit nuclear weapons to these five States, and to stop others from gaining access to them. Some countries have however succeeded in doing so; others have been stopped, either by force, as in the case of Iraq, or by negotiation (Libya, South Africa, Brazil).

I believe that information and discussion will enable us to demonstrate that nuclear weapons are dangerous. This could begin with the need to do away with tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. An international campaign is supposed to get under way soon on this issue, in order to bring pressure to bear on NATO and Russia. We also should encourage multilateralism. The

bilateralism of the Start agreements between Russia and the United States isn't enough, even if these two countries alone are in possession of 95% of the global stockpile. The multilateral approach, which is that of the NPT proposes that everyone gather around the negotiation table together in 2012 to work on the denuclearisation of the Middle East. Some people believe that it will be difficult for Iran and Israel to reach agreement. We'll see...

One way or the other, working towards disarmament will involve different stages, with guarantees at different levels and imposing procedures for verification that are fundamental to taking the process through to its successful conclusion.

Finally we really need a campaign of public information if we are to gain popular support. We are, after all, living in a democracy, even if we often hear people say that the use of nuclear weapons is not something that sits well with democratic processes. This should not stop us from holding discussions as to the relevance of maintaining nuclear weapons as a means of bringing pressure to bear on political leaders. Let us bear in mind that nuclear force has existed since Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed by the Americans in 1945, causing 200,000 deaths. This was a terrible real-life experiment, because we now know from reading the archives that have been published that it was quite unnecessary; the bombing of Tokyo had already caused 100,000 deaths and brought Japan to its knees. There has been no real public debate in the world for sixty-five years as to the interest of maintaining nuclear weapons as “weapons of non-use”. We often hear this expression used by strong supporters of nuclear weapons, who also state that they are not immoral, as they are not deployed! I leave it to you to appreciate the sophism of this statement, as in the history of humankind, there is unfortunately no such thing as weapons that have not been used, including chemical and biological ones.

3. SUPPORT FOR THE GLOBAL ZERO APPROACH¹

In spite of the undeniable progress that has been made in recent years, the nuclear disarmament process is likely to stagnate for the following reasons:

- In the United States, the upcoming presidential election and current divisions in opinion are not conducive to new initiatives.
- In Russia, nuclear weapons are perceived as a means of rebalancing inferiority in conventional forces, and maintaining Russia's status as a great power. Russia is therefore unlikely to be the country that will make major short-term disarmament initiatives.
- China, Pakistan and India possess nuclear weapons, (not recognised in the NPT). They appear to be quietly and constantly strengthening their stockpile of weapons. Pakistan is even blocking the negotiations aimed at concluding a treaty that will ban the production of fissile material.
- Economic and financial concerns are dominating international policy discussions in Europe, and have eclipsed debate on issues of progressive and total nuclear disarmament of nuclear stockpiles.

In this context, I consider the Global Zero initiative that I support can be most useful, firstly in focusing public opinion, as the public has been marginalised from these discussions. The initiative can also help win the support of many public figures from different countries and different walks of life. Finally, it will help to build a strategy that will lead to the progressive and total abolition of nuclear stockpiles.

The proposal to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from Europe is a first step that could accelerate awareness and lead to the multilateral negotiations that Global Zero is calling for.

Why does France not feel concerned by this debate? I would like to remind you that when the French rejoined the integrated military structure of NATO, they specifically did not join the group on nuclear plans, wishing to mark the independence of their attitude to nuclear matters. The reticence that they have expressed concerning the idea of the proposed withdrawal can be

¹ Speech made at the Global Zero Summit in Los Angeles (12th and 13th October 2011).

explained by the fear that a form of denuclearisation of an important part of Europe, would not enable them to envisage the deployment of their own planes that are equipped with nuclear missiles, in the case of a crisis. There is also fear that the three French squadrons that have nuclear capacity might be considered at some point in the discussion as tactical weapons, and that pressure might be brought to bear on them to do away with them. At a deeper level, I believe that France fears a devaluation of the function of nuclear dissuasion, which is something that they consider as the fundamental guarantee of the country's security.

These arguments do not seem totally relevant to me. It is true that the proposed measures would symbolically reduce the nuclear weapons capacity in the organisation of the continent's security. But it would also be the equally symbolic commitment of a lesser dependence of Europe on American nuclear weapons. France, who has long pleaded for Europe to be less dependent on their American protectors, could indeed find that their theories are proven in this respect!

As to including French nuclear-armed planes in the category of tactical weapons, this would overlook the fact that French airplanes are stationed either on French territories or on French aircraft carriers. They can therefore not be assimilated with American weapons deployed outside the United States.

Nevertheless if an American-Russian negotiation on the overall nuclear weapons issue were to begin, and lead to a significant reduction in the nuclear weapons' stockpile, both France and the United Kingdom would be obliged to follow suit, as to fail to do so would be a failure to respect their commitments in terms of disarmament under the NPT.

But for there to be a real chance of success, an agreement between Russia and NATO would need to be concluded on the issue of ballistic anti-missile defence. In this respect, the introduction by the United States of a powerful radar in South-East Turkey as well as SM-3 type interceptors in the South of Rumania and Poland, without sufficient dialogue with Russia, is worrisome. I believe that France, sharing Russia's concern that anti-missile defence does not take away from the credibility of their dissuasion, could play an active role in the mediation of a rapprochement on the points of view between Russia and the allies.

If France is to become a more dynamic actor in nuclear disarmament, the

country needs to revise its own policies. The French line on dissuasion cannot remain irrevocable, given that the strategic situation has totally changed. It will become necessary to specifically recognise that nuclear weapons no longer play the strategic role that they did during the Cold War, and that France and Europe are no longer exposed to a threat of massive aggression.

4. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY¹

I found the title of the round table discussion “The evolution of the role of nuclear weapons in European security” perplexing, because it fails to examine several questions that first need to be asked. It is impossible to reply to this in just a few minutes, but I would nevertheless like to ask the following questions:

- What are the threats that Europe is currently facing, or likely to face?
- Who is responsible for ensuring Europe’s security? The States, the European Union, NATO or the United States?
- What means need to be implemented?

The update of the “White paper on defence and national security²” (published in 2008) that has recently become public provides an interesting indication on the current state of the world and the major trends of the last four years. It draws the conclusions as to how things could move forwards in terms of France’s strategic posture. I do not fully share them, particularly as there does not appear to be any evolution as to the role of nuclear weapons. The classical formula is repeated: “Nuclear dissuasion provides the ultimate guarantee of our national independence and our independent decision-making will be preserved in the case of State aggression against our vital interests, whatever the source of nature of this threat”. The chapter called “maintaining our strategic independence as a guideline” (page 54) is quite explicit in its title alone.

Given that this deals with the means to be implemented to ensure and guarantee security, it is obvious – even if this is sometimes overlooked – that military means are only part of the answer. There are civil and financial

¹ Speech given at the IRIS seminar, 5th March 2012 as member of the round table discussion on « the evolution of the role of nuclear weapons in European security »

² *Défense et sécurité nationale, le livre blanc*, La Documentation française/Odile Jacob, 2008.

means, the fight against lack of development, and of course, diplomacy, responsible for “bringing together” all these various tools.

To come back to the issue of military means and the role of nuclear weapons in European security, I would clearly state, even if this may shock some people, that they are a hindrance. They form part of “an inheritance from the past”, that we don’t know how to get rid of.

Obviously the difficulty in “creating a world without nuclear weapons” is that of the intermediate phase and the concrete implementation, given the fact that States do not wish to be exposed, and to first and foremost defend their interests, as well as the different opinions as to how best to fight the major danger of nuclear proliferation.

The proposal that has been made by some people to begin by withdrawing American tactical nuclear weapons from Europe could provide a sort of “opener” for the inevitable multilateral negotiation required to achieve nuclear disarmament. To this effect, I would like to briefly sum up the position of Global Zero. It is one of which I approve, and I have signed the call.

The proposal of Global Zero

This proposal is based on the observation that both Russian and American tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe no longer have any military use. There is general agreement on this point. They now only represent the political symbol of NATO’s cohesion. Furthermore, their deployment is synonymous of both risks and expenditure, with a very hypothetical return.

This stockpile could be considerably reduced in the framework of a new exhaustive bilateral agreement between the United States and Russia. Such an agreement should include all categories of nuclear weapons without exception, and establish limits as to their overall numbers. It should impose both qualitative and quantitative limits and include the means to verify the withdrawal of Russian and American tactical nuclear weapons from operational combat bases as well as their return to national storage bases on their respective territories.

For Global Zero, the fact of including the withdrawal of American tactical nuclear weapons based in Europe in an exhaustive bi-lateral agreement with Russia would serve the interests of NATO security as well as those of Russia. This approach would reduce risks, promote a new architecture of European

security, founded on cooperation and transparency, and accelerate the bilateral and multilateral negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons and achieve the objective of a nuclear weapons-free world.

What should France do?

I have had the opportunity¹ to question the relevance of the arguments that are used to explain France's lack of interest in this discussion. But over and above these considerations, I believe that the French attitude on dissuasion needs to evolve, because we are living in a different world from that of the second half of the twentieth century. What is stopping us from moving on from this single-mindedness, made up of policies based on rigid certainties and concepts that we are not allowed to discuss (the "life insurance policy", "strict sufficiency" "nuclear peace" and "ultimate warning"...) ? How come we are not allowed to imagine, outside of certain "in" circles what the apocalyptic consequences of the use of these so-called weapons of non-use would be?

Nuclear weapons no longer play the fundamental role they played during the Cold War. Our present nuclear stockpile is only used to guarantee us against nuclear attack. I therefore believe that it would be advisable to consider new reduction measures and move away from the unilateral approach that France has taken thus far. France should no longer refuse the principle of ultimately committing to a multilateral framework of discussion with the other recognised nuclear powers. This is how the country can best contribute to improving European security.

¹ C.f. chapter 3, « Support for the Global Zero approach ».

5. THE FIGHT AGAINST NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION¹

The compromise of the NPT

Nuclear proliferation is the main risk to global security. Until now it has been limited thanks to programmes instituted based on the non-proliferation treaty² (NPT). But the results of this implementation are mixed, particularly as three de facto nuclear powers – Israel, India and Pakistan – are not signatories. This treaty is based on a global compromise between the States that have nuclear weapons and those who do not, and it is aimed at limiting the discriminatory nature of the treaty³.

Thus the non-nuclear countries agree to not acquire nuclear weapons (article II), with nuclear countries having a dual corresponding obligation to:

- Respect the right of non-nuclear countries to use nuclear energy to peaceful ends (article IV)
- Hold disarmament negotiations “in good faith” (article VI)

The strengthening of the guarantees offered by the NPT thus implies that progress will be made in terms of nuclear disarmament. The recognition of the right of non-nuclear countries to nuclear energy for peaceful means, does however create certain serious difficulties. Civil and military nuclear technologies have much in common, and the complex set of international regulations established has not done away with the fears of proliferation. The suspicion of illicit activities has weighed on several signatory States (North Korea, Syria, Iran).

Countries with a high level of know-how in the field of nuclear technology, such as Egypt, Algeria, Syria or Brazil are opposed to an extension to the

¹ Article published in *Le Figaro* on 20th April 2010 under the title « Désarmer et lutter contre la prolifération » and an interview on the site terraeco.net

² This treaty was originally essentially designed to stop any possibility of German nuclear armament became almost universal in the 1990s (it was ratified by France in 1992.). It was extended for an indefinite period in 1995

³ The NPT is discriminatory inasmuch as it recognises five countries' right to nuclear weapons, which are refused to other signatories. This explains why France refused to sign for many years.

verification system implemented by the IAEA (International Agency for Atomic Energy). They believe that they are not beholden to accept the binding verification measures, as long as those States that do have nuclear weapons have not fulfilled the obligations in terms of disarmament.

The evolution of the United States

The importance of the Start agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons is not so much the limits that it sets, as the upper limits are not very far from that level actually achieved by the two powers⁴. Its impact lies mostly in the verification measures and mutual information sharing that it contains, as these are likely to strengthen trust and transparency, both of which are essential to maintaining the disarmament dynamic. For the agreement to show genuine progress it is essential that the American and Russian presidents succeed in ratifying it quickly, and commit to new weapons' reductions, not only in the field of strategic weapons, but also in that of tactical weapons.

Uncertainties remain however as to the next initiatives that president Obama will take. What will be the exact form of the recent commitment made by the United States to not threaten non-nuclear countries that respect the NPT with nuclear weapons? Will these States commit full-heartedly to negotiating a “cut-off” treaty, to forbidding the verification of the production of fissile matter for military purposes? We can indeed fear that the American Senate will continue to refuse to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and thus prevent it from being implemented.

The Obama administration's results in terms of disarmament are therefore likely to prove insufficient to guarantee the success of the conference that will examine the NPT, scheduled to take place at the United Nations headquarters between the 3rd and the 28th of May 2010. The stakes of this conference are of capital importance, as it aims to prevent a crisis of the non-proliferation

⁴ Due essentially to the regulations governing the counting of nuclear war-heads, bombs and missiles transported by each bomber being considered as a single war-head.

programme.

In parallel, the decisions taken during the global Nuclear Security Summit of 12th and 13th April 2010, aimed at improving the coordination of national efforts to fight against the piracy of fissile matter to illicit ends will not be in a position to reach expectations unless the non-nuclear States fully cooperate. This cooperation itself will depend on the commitments made by the nuclear States in the field of disarmament.

What role should France play?

In this indecisive situation, France should not remain inactive. The country could, for example, jointly with other member States of the European Union, take initiatives to extend the initiative started by president Obama:

1. Recognise that nuclear weapons have lost the fundamental use that they played during the Cold War, as France as Europe are no longer exposed the threat of massive aggression.

2. Consequently redefine the role of nuclear weapons in terms of national security strategy. According to the official line of government, nuclear dissuasion provides “the ultimate guarantee of national independence and autonomous decision-making” of France. This guarantee could obviously not be enforced other than under the hypothesis, which has now become improbable, of a massive aggression against the vital interests of the country. Only an attack using weapons of mass destruction would justify a nuclear response. The French weapons’ stockpile is only dissuasive because of its nuclear capacity. Deciding on its volume on the basis of the “strict sufficiency” principle should be revised downwards, inasmuch as the reduction of the stockpile of the other nuclear powers, and the reliability of the international non-proliferation regime are confirmed.

3. Examine the possibility of committing to a no-first-use of nuclear weapons. This is something that was not possible during the Cold War, due to the superiority of the Warsaw pact in the field of conventional weapons.

4. Accept the request of the non-nuclear States to reinforce the “negative security assurance” given by the nuclear States. This would imply committing via an international legal instrument to not using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear State.

5. Explicitly accept the perspective of a world without nuclear weapons with a dual condition: the implementation of a verification process and ordering the reduction of all existing nuclear stockpiles to achieve their elimination, and strengthen the non-proliferation regime in order to prevent any new appearance of a State with nuclear capacity; there should be a possibility of this being binding.

6. Improve transparency on existing stockpiles, by committing to a policy of increased transparency, such as has been the case of the United Kingdom, as to the level and nature of one’s own nuclear stockpiles.

7. Accept the constraints negotiated as to the level and nature of nuclear weapons owned by France. Given the disproportion between the different nuclear stockpiles¹, France cannot now enter into a negotiation on nuclear disarmament. The country should, however accept, if required by signing a treaty, that the level of armament be frozen, by reducing the extent of the modernisation in progress.

8. Propose to NATO that the new “strategic concept” include the need for American-Russian negotiation on the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons²...

9. Organise a European approach to the United States to request that they instantly ratify the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). This could become a major theme of transatlantic discussions.

10. Request the immediate opening within the European framework, of negotiations on establishing a denuclearised zone in the Middle East.

This is how full meaning can be given to resolution 1887 of the Security Council of the United Nations, thanks to simultaneous efforts to fight against nuclear proliferation and promote nuclear disarmament, as this resolution states the will to “create the conditions for a nuclear weapons-free world, in accordance with the objectives quoted in the non-proliferation treaty on nuclear weapons”.

¹ Russian and the United States combined account for over 95% of the existing stockpile

² France could support the request of four countries (Germany, the Netherlands and Norway), that call for the withdrawal of the 200 or 300 American tactical weapons currently aimed at arming European combat aircraft.

6. HOW CAN WE TALK ABOUT NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT?¹

The issue of nuclear disarmament was discussed the other evening in Albi². This can't have been a very attractive subject for the media, as the press was absent... Nevertheless the faculty lecture hall was packed, and we spent the evening listening to people from the left-wing parties express their point of view, and debate passionately with the participants on the issues of war and peace, nuclear armament, the U.N. and NATO...

Some people spoke ironically about the supposed futility of meetings of this kind, and the somewhat repetitive nature of the proclamations that they produce. But they are mistaken, because discussion is always useful in a democracy, particularly when the subject under discussion is not part of the "regulatory subjects" imposed by the press, something the political world all too often fails to take into consideration.

For my part, I tried to situate the question in its historical context, reminding people of the hope that was born at the fall of the Berlin Wall on the 9th of November 1989: that of the end of the arms' race³ and the beginning of a period that would be favourable to peace and the development of democracy. This hope has come to nothing, if we look at the impressive succession of conflicts that have ravaged the world over the last twenty two years: Serbia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Chechnya, Iraq, Georgia, Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine, the Sudan, the region of the Great Lakes...

I underlined that more than ever in the current period of serious global crisis that governments will have to:

- Use their ability to provide clear answers to worried populations who are increasingly overwhelmed by inequalities and injustice, to avoid them listening, as they once did, to the sirens of demagogy and authoritarianism
- Be highly prudent in international relations
- Be strong-willed in their exploration of all paths that can appease conflicts: development assistance, support for democracy, and disarmament.

¹ On Paul Quilès's blog, <http://paul.quiles.over-blog.com> (18th December 2011).

² Public meeting called by the Appel des Cent, the COT, and the MAN, moderated by Pierre Bouveret, director of the Armaments' Observatory.

³ The number of nuclear warheads tripled in the thirty years between 1960 and 1990.

On this last issue, I have noted that in spite of genuine progress in terms of the reduction of nuclear stockpiles⁴, that the disarmament process is moving forward too slowly, and that many obstacles remain.

The main threats to global security are those of terrorism and nuclear proliferation. They call for a response other than nuclear weapons: the implementation of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation, control of enriched uranium and plutonium production, the creation of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) ⁵, implementation of the nuclear test ban treaty, the international convention for the repression of acts of nuclear terrorism...

Nuclear disarmament is therefore a necessity, not only because these weapons are of no use and costly (100 billion dollars per year for the nine nuclear powers), but also because they are dangerous. We now know that during the Cold War their use was envisaged on at least twenty different occasions, and that on two of these (the Cuban crisis of 1953 and the Kippur war in 1973), that we were only a hair's breadth from actually using them.

Nuclear disarmament will only become a genuine reality if the nuclear States (including France, who has been too shy about these matters thus far) commit to a multilateral approach, set stages, and accept the introduction of guarantee and verification systems.

Public opinion, which is the only way to convince public decision-makers (politicians as well as the military-industrial lobby...that acts as advisor to politicians), mobilises. This implies denouncing the "false consensus", especially on the "life insurance policy" that nuclear weapons represent.

It is because I am convinced of the need for this action that I approve of the Global Zero approach and that of the European Leadership Network (ELN). The latter is a network of European public figures who are working towards this end.

This is also why I became a member of "Mayors for Peace" two years ago. This network includes over 100 French communes and brings together 5,00

⁴ Nuclear stockpiles were reduced over a twenty-year period from 70,000 to 23,000. This still represents the equivalent of 450,000 Hiroshima bombs.

⁵ There are currently 6 NWFZs. A signatory member meeting of the NPT is supposed to be held in 2012 to examine the feasibility of a NWFZ in the Middle East.

people at global level. Their objective is to promote a “culture of peace” and act as relays for international campaigns promoting a world free of nuclear weapons.

7. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION¹

The strategy of nuclear disarmament no longer appears to be adapted to the main risks that are confronting the States that use it. According to the White Paper, its objective is only to “prevent aggression by States against the country’s vital interests”. It is difficult to imagine in the current situation, from where this threat might come.

Furthermore, an international system in which some nuclear powers might consider that they alone have the right to possess weapons that are supposed to provide the absolute guarantee of security, would ultimately not prove viable. The non-nuclear States that believe that their fundamental interests of security are not taken into account in this system, would then make efforts to gain access to the bomb. After Israel, India and Pakistan, proliferation would inevitably spread to Iran and then to other countries.

It is therefore necessary to free ourselves of the dogma of dissuasion, and turn towards a cooperative security policy that takes the legitimate interests of all States into account. Defence and disarmament should be considered by the nuclear powers as complementary instruments to guarantee their security. The new American line of foreign policy can help rebuild trust in the disarmament process that was voided of its content by the Bush administration. The United States and Russia have committed to concluding an agreement to replace the Start treaty on the reduction of strategic weapons. This will have the specific advantage of being based on a system of verifications, and will therefore permit new progress to be made in terms of controlling weapons. The American administration has also set two priorities: the ratification of a treaty to totally ban nuclear tests and the negotiation of a treaty to stop production of fissile matter for military use. Success in these fields would create a genuine movement in favour of nuclear disarmament.

The fight against proliferation would not, however, be credible or legitimate unless it went hand in hand with an effort by the nuclear powers to “pursue

¹ This article was published in *L'Humanité* on 31st October 2009, under the title of « Il est regrettable que Nicolas Sarkozy oppose désarmement et lutte contre la prolifération ».

negotiations in good faith” on nuclear disarmament². It is the combined character of disarmament and the fight against proliferation that has been recognised by the United Nations Security Council³.

It is regrettable that Nicolas Sarkozy appears to have been opposed to disarmament and the fight against proliferation on this occasion, leaving people to understand that only the latter provided a response to real emergencies. Such a position can but enhance the idea of many emerging State’s leaders, that France is first and foremost attempting to defend a monopoly, without paying much heed to other States’ preoccupation with legitimate security interests.

Progress in terms of nuclear disarmament also implies developing controls over fissile matter. The negotiations need to initially focus on stopping the production of fissile matter for military use. The longer-term aim should be to achieve international control of this production. This would meet three objectives: a solid guarantee against all attempts at proliferation, total transparency on nuclear stockpiles and efficient protection against the danger of nuclear terrorism.

Furthermore, if we also wish to convince India, Pakistan and Israel to commit to a non-proliferation treaty, we need to aim to reduce existing stockpiles to the lowest possible level, as has United States and Russia have already begun to do.

As to France, the country could participate more actively in these efforts by entering into a process of negotiation on its own nuclear weapons, without limiting itself to merely announcing the negotiations on the reduction of its nuclear capacity made by Nicolas Sarkozy in March 2010⁴. It could also totally or partially interrupt the modernisation programmes of the existing stockpiles⁵; this would constitute a decisive step on the road to disarmament.

² In accordance with article VI of the NPT.

³ Resolution 1887, adopted on 24th September 2009.

⁴ A 30% reduction in airborne elements, establishing an upper limit of 300 units for nuclear warheads.

⁵ France could, for example interrupt its strategic M51 missile programme that appears to be more some sort of left-over from the Cold War, than a suitably adapted instrument of defence.

POSTFACE

These various articles are a call to reflect, discuss and to take action. Some people will no doubt consider the approach of no great use, or even dangerous. Just imagine: to undermine the “French consensus” on the importance of nuclear dissuasion, the “life insurance policy” and “ultimate guarantee of our security” and our “vital interests”!

I have tried to demonstrate how the climate that results from the use of these terms is demobilising, as it makes debate on the subject almost impossible outside circles of experts, be they military or civil ones. Continually referring to the so-called consensus on the interest of nuclear weapons anaesthetises politicians and commentators, with the result that the vital nature of what is at stake no longer appears clear.

Who is asking what the purpose of this “weapon of non-use” really is? The justification of a weapon that is presented as efficient and even “moral” because it should not be used (the non-use), glosses over the case where it might actually be used. The terrifying consequences are never mentioned, for the very good reason that the theoreticians of dissuasion proclaim that it is important to remain vague as to the targets and the effects of a nuclear bomb. Because I believe I am well-informed on these issues, and that I have had the opportunity to examine the issue of nuclear weapons on several occasions through my various political responsibilities, and that my own approach to the subject has progressed, I do not feel satisfied with the way the issue is handled: silence, approximations, counter-truths, slogans, authoritarian arguments...that all add up to what I would call “a French fib”.

I am pleased to note that many voices, including those of eminent international public figures are being raised to defend the idea of nuclear disarmament. I have included a brief presentation in the annexes to this book of the framework of the movements this includes. Their positions and their commitments form the hope of future generations who can not accept the idea of inheriting something of which they disapprove, as so eloquently expressed by the three young students who wrote the preface to this book.

ANNEXES

Annexe I Global Zero

Global Zero is the international movement for the elimination of all nuclear weapons (www.globalzero.org).

Since its launch in Paris in December 2008, Global Zero has grown to include 300 eminent world leaders and more than 400,000 citizens worldwide; developed a step-by-step plan to eliminate nuclear weapons, built an international student movement with more than 100 campus chapters in ten countries, and produced the acclaimed documentary film, *Countdown to Zero*.

Global Zero members understand that the only way to eliminate the nuclear threat — including proliferation and nuclear terrorism — is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, secure all nuclear materials and eliminate all nuclear weapons: global zero. The movement combines cutting-edge policy development and direct dialogue with governments with public outreach, including media, online and grassroots initiatives to make the elimination of nuclear weapons an urgent global imperative.

President Barack Obama, President Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister David Cameron, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon have endorsed Global Zero, with Obama declaring, “Global Zero will always have a partner in me and my administration.” Leading newspapers have backed Global Zero’s plan, the *Financial Times* concluding that, “Global Zero’s plan has shown the direction to be travelled; the world’s leaders must now start moving.”

Getting to Zero

Phase I (2010 - 2013)

Following the ratification of the New START Treaty, the US and Russia will negotiate a bilateral accord to reduce to 1,000 total warheads each (to be implemented by 2018). Earlier if possible, but not later than the ratification of the US-Russia bilateral accord, all other nuclear weapons countries will freeze the total number of warheads in their arsenals and commit to participate in multilateral negotiations for proportionate reductions of stockpiles. Preparation for multilateral negotiations will then begin.

Phase II (2014 - 2018)

In a multilateral framework, the US and Russia will agree to reduce to 500 total warheads each (to be implemented by 2021) as long as all other nuclear weapons countries agree to maintain the freeze on their stockpiles until 2018, followed by proportionate reductions until 2021. A comprehensive verification/enforcement system will be established, including no-notice, on-site inspections, and safeguards on the civilian nuclear fuel cycle will be strengthened in order to prevent diversion of materials to build weapons.

Phase III (2019 - 2023)

Negotiate a Global Zero Accord: a legally binding international agreement, signed by all nuclear capable countries, for the phased, verified, proportionate reduction of all nuclear arsenals to zero total warheads by 2030.

Phase IV (2024 - 2030)

Complete the phased, verified, proportionate dismantlement of all nuclear arsenals to zero total warheads by 2030, and continue the comprehensive verification and enforcement system prohibiting the development and possession of nuclear weapons.

Annexe II Mayors for Peace

In August 1945, atomic bombs instantaneously reduced the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to rubble, taking hundreds of thousands of precious lives. Today, more than sixty years after the war, thousands of citizens still suffer the devastating aftereffects of radiation and unfathomable emotional pain. To prevent any repetition of the A-bomb tragedy, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have continually sought to tell the world about the inhumane cruelty of nuclear weapons and have consistently urged that nuclear weapons be abolished.

On June 24, 1982, at the 2nd UN Special Session on Disarmament held at UN Headquarters in New York, then Mayor Takeshi Araki of Hiroshima proposed a new Program to Promote the Solidarity of Cities toward the Total Abolition of Nuclear Weapons. This proposal offered cities a way to transcend national borders and work together to press for nuclear abolition. Subsequently, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki called on mayors around the world to support this program.

The Mayors for Peace is composed of cities around the world that have formally expressed support for the program Mayor Araki announced in 1982. As of October 1, 2012, membership stood at 5,418 cities in 155 countries and regions. In March 1990, the Mayors Conference was officially registered as a UN NGO related to the Department of Public Information. In May 1991, it became a Category II NGO (currently called a NGO in “Special Consultative Status”) registered with the Economic and Social Council.

www.mayorsforpeace.org

Annexe III : The network of parliamentarians in favour of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

by Jean-Marie Collin

Director of the Network for France and independent consultant¹

French, New Zealand, Russian, Mexican and Japanese parliamentarians all work together to promote nuclear disarmament, in the same manner as global economy is interdependent. This is something that Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary General of the United Nations wished to underline during an international conference on disarmament organised by the network of parliamentarians for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (PNND)²: “After decades of work it is obvious that genuine change will only come about through strong, repeated pressure of public opinion at global level, on a bottom-up basis. This is why you have such a crucial role to play: the voice of the legislators should be at the heart of the debate”.

Parliamentarians vote on budgets, formalise obligations of transparency and public responsibilities, debate on policies, approve treaties, adopt legislation, and also represent the voice of their citizens. They are therefore a key element in promoting nuclear disarmament; their field actions and on-going work ensure the correct implementation and follow-up of international regulations at national level. Parliaments therefore bring not merely their specific vision to disarmament, but also “a strong approach and strength of implementation”, as Sergio Duarte, High Representative of the United Nations for Disarmament affairs stated.

Since 2002, the PNND network, which is a non party-political forum - has brought together 800 parliamentarians on five continents (in 80 countries). It is committed to preventing proliferation and promoting nuclear disarmament. Their actions consist mainly of holding meetings, exchange between legislators of different countries, irrespective of whether these countries are or are not nuclear powers, thereby contributing to improving dialogue and implementing discussions and resolutions aimed at improving international security. The role and work of PNND was recognised by the Foundation for

¹ In charge of the blog « Défense et géopolitique » for *Alternatives Internationales*. <http://alternatives-economiques.fr/blogs/collin>

² c . f. PNND. site <http://www.gsinsitute.org/pnnd/francais.html>

Right Livelihood that honoured the global coordinator of this network, the New Zealander Alyn Ware, by awarding him the Right Livelihood Award, commonly referred to as the alternative Nobel prize. The PNND network has, for many years multiplied its initiatives to:

- Create a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East (meeting with Iranian parliamentarians), in North-East Asia (conferences between Japanese and Korean parliamentarians), in the Arctic with a view to preventing the militarization of this area.
- The adoption of resolutions in different international bodies such as that adopted during the 120th Assembly of the IPU (10th of April 2009): “Promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and ensure the implementation of the treaty totally banning nuclear tests: the role of parliaments”.
- Encourage the process of adoption of the 5-point plan put forward by Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.
- Multiply the initiatives to hold meetings between parliamentarians (French and British in November 2010).

The work dynamic that is implemented by the PNND is unique. It is an approach that appears logical, according to the Canadian Douglas Roche¹, given the dynamics of nuclear disarmament with which legislators are and will be increasingly confronted: “It is a social movement, a movement that is mature, and nothing can stop it. The end of slavery, colonialism, and apartheid are examples of social movements that were initially rejected by political leaders. Although these ideas had begun to take root in public opinion, they were vigorously opposed until – by dint of persevering – they became an accepted attitude, the norm for a new social order”.

2012, handing over atomic power

The international community, including France, therefore have no alternative

¹ International president of Middle Powers Initiative, president of Pugwash Canada, president of the Canadian Association of the United Nations, and special advisor on disarmament and security to the Holy See delegation to the United Nations.

to preparing for this event that will become the norm! 2012 is a particular year for France as an official nuclear power, as the country will be holding presidential elections; the president is also head of the military forces. This man or woman who will be elected will have a unique power: that of being able to deploy military nuclear weapons at any given moment, and to use them against another State. If the president were one day to take this terrible decision, he would have to take it alone. Without any outside consultations or global reflections. He would only have a few minutes to decide on the strike. Faced by the choice of pushing on the nuclear button, he would be on his own, confronting his moral and ethical responsibilities.

A few weeks before this election to the highest office, it therefore appears highly relevant to query this power that is conferred on a single person. This query is all the more relevant when we realise that the issue of nuclear dissuasion in France is one of those areas where discussion is not accepted, let alone disagreement, according to the reigning elite.

The reason for this is very simple. Since nuclear dissuasion was invented and activated in 1964 (by the strategic air forces), it has been considered as a sacrosanct state religion. The Bomb has become a sacred dogma that nobody dares question, as they risk of being labelled as a dreamer or adversary of the French Republic. Here are the three elements that make up the trinity of nuclear armament: security, prestige and low cost. Obviously this particular prayer addressed to Saint Bomb concludes with a special kind of Amen, that of a taboo that guarantees absolute silence on any opposition or more simply as any query as to the place and the role of these non-conventional weapons in France’s defence.

Like all religions, it has its icons that strengthen its aura. These men are scientists like Bertrand Goldschmidt and Yves Rocard, members of the armed forces such as Albert Buchalet, Charles Ailleret, Lucien Poirier, Pierre-Marie Gallois and politicians like Guy Mollet. They have created a military nuclear complex or put forth the doctrine of the Bomb. But one of them rises above the others: General de Gaulle, the first head of State to give the order to fire the first nuclear test². The logical result of this is that to challenge the Bomb

² This first nuclear test, called Gerboise bleue, was carried out on 13th February 1960 at Reggane, in the Sahara desert. France carried out a total of 210 nuclear tests (45 above ground, 165 underground) in both the Sahara (between 13th February 1960

is perceived by political and military circles as a direct criticism of this historical French figure.

This sort of State religion allows us to understand why in this era of globalisation, with ideas that travel and develop so fast, France has adopted an autistic attitude to all ideas emanating from a different religion, coming mainly from the English-speaking world, the world of abolitionist and promoters of Zero nuclear weapons.

Thus when an ex-minister for Defence, who is also ex-president of the commission for defence of the national Assembly (French parliament) - who bathed in the waters of Mururoa in 1985 after a nuclear test - very officially undermines the efficiency and relevance of nuclear weapons today, it seems to me quite normal, as an independent consultant and coordinator of the French PNND network, to approve of his approach and add some complementary aspects to the positions taken by Paul Quilès.

and 16th February 1966) and on the French Polynesian atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa (from 2nd July 1966 to 27th January 1966.).

Annexe IV

Excerpts from Barack Obama's speech in Prague, 6th April 2009

[...]

Now, one of those issues that I'll focus on today is fundamental to the security of our nations and to the peace of the world -- that's the future of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.

The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War. No nuclear war was fought between the United States and the Soviet Union, but generations lived with the knowledge that their world could be erased in a single flash of light. Cities like Prague that existed for centuries, that embodied the beauty and the talent of so much of humanity, would have ceased to exist.

Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold.

Now, understand, this matters to people everywhere. One nuclear weapon exploded in one city -- be it New York or Moscow, Islamabad or Mumbai, Tokyo or Tel Aviv, Paris or Prague -- could kill hundreds of thousands of people. And no matter where it happens, there is no end to what the consequences might be -- for our global safety, our security, our society, our economy, to our ultimate survival. [...]

Just as we stood for freedom in the 20th century, we must stand together for the right of people everywhere to live free from fear in the 21st century. (Applause.) And as nuclear power -- as a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavour alone, but we can lead it, we can start it.

So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. (Applause.) I'm not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly -- perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, "Yes, we can." (Applause.)

Now, let me describe to you the trajectory we need to be on. First, the United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same. Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defence to our allies -- including the Czech Republic. But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal.

To reduce our warheads and stockpiles, we will negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russians this year. (Applause.) President Medvedev and I began this process in London, and will seek a new agreement by the end of this year that is legally binding and sufficiently bold. And this will set the stage for further cuts, and we will seek to include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavour.

To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. (Applause.) After more than five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned.

And to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, the United States will seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons. If we are serious about stopping the spread of these weapons, then we should put an end to the dedicated production of weapons-grade materials that create them. That's the first step. Second, together we will strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a basis for cooperation.

The basic bargain is sound: Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy. To strengthen the treaty, we should embrace several principles. We need more resources and

authority to strengthen international inspections. We need real and immediate consequences for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the treaty without cause.

And we should build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank, so that countries can access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation. That must be the right of every nation that renounces nuclear weapons, especially developing countries embarking on peaceful programs. And no approach will succeed if it's based on the denial of rights to nations that play by the rules. We must harness the power of nuclear energy on behalf of our efforts to combat climate change, and to advance peace opportunity for all people.

But we go forward with no illusions. Some countries will break the rules. That's why we need a structure in place that ensures when any nation does, they will face consequences.

Just this morning, we were reminded again of why we need a new and more rigorous approach to address this threat. North Korea broke the rules once again by testing a rocket that could be used for long range missiles. This provocation underscores the need for action -- not just this afternoon at the U.N. Security Council, but in our determination to prevent the spread of these weapons.

Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something. The world must stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons. Now is the time for a strong international response -- (applause) -- now is the time for a strong international response, and North Korea must know that the path to security and respect will never come through threats and illegal weapons. All nations must come together to build a stronger, global regime. And that's why we must stand shoulder to shoulder to pressure the North Koreans to change course.

Iran has yet to build a nuclear weapon. My administration will seek engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect. We believe in dialogue. (Applause.) But in that dialogue we will present a clear choice. We want Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations, politically and economically. We will support Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy with rigorous inspections. That's a path that the Islamic Republic can take. Or the government can choose increased isolation, international

pressure, and a potential nuclear arms race in the region that will increase insecurity for all.

So let me be clear: Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile activity poses a real threat, not just to the United States, but to Iran's neighbours and our allies. The Czech Republic and Poland have been courageous in agreeing to host a defence against these missiles. As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defence system that is cost-effective and proven. (Applause.) If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defence construction in Europe will be removed. (Applause.)

So, finally, we must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe. To protect our people, we must act with a sense of purpose without delay.

So today I am announcing a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. We will set new standards, expand our cooperation with Russia, pursue new partnerships to lock down these sensitive materials.

We must also build on our efforts to break up black markets, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt this dangerous trade. Because this threat will be lasting, we should come together to turn efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into durable international institutions. And we should start by having a Global Summit on Nuclear Security that the United States will host within the next year. (Applause.)

Now, I know that there are some who will question whether we can act on such a broad agenda. There are those who doubt whether true international cooperation is possible, given inevitable differences among nations. And there are those who hear talk of a world without nuclear weapons and doubt whether it's worth setting a goal that seems impossible to achieve.

[...]

Annexe V

Resolution 1887, adopted by the United Nations Security Council, 24th September 2009

The Security Council,

Resolving to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all,

Reaffirming the Statement of its President adopted at the Council's meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,

[...]

1. Emphasizes that a situation of non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations shall be brought to the attention of the Security Council, which will determine if that situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and **emphasizes** the Security Council's primary responsibility in addressing such threats;

2. Calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations and fulfil their commitments under the Treaty,

3. Notes that enjoyment of the benefits of the NPT by a State Party can be assured only by its compliance with the obligations thereunder;

4. Calls upon all States that are not Parties to the NPT to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date, and pending their accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms;

5. Calls upon the Parties to the NPT, pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty, to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and **calls on** all other States to join in this endeavour;

6. Calls upon all States Parties to the NPT to cooperate so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty's three pillars: non-proliferation,

the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament;

7. Calls upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force at an early date;

8. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as soon as possible, **welcomes** the Conference on Disarmament's adoption by consensus of its Program of Work in 2009, and **requests** all Member States to cooperate in guiding the Conference to an early commencement of substantive work;

9. Recalls the statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, noted by resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT, and **affirms** that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime;

10. Expresses particular concern at the current major challenges to the non-proliferation regime that the Security Council has acted upon, **demands** that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions, and **reaffirms** its call upon them to find an early negotiated solution to these issues;

11. Encourages efforts to ensure development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy by countries seeking to maintain or develop their capacities in this field in a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security, and safety;

12. Underlines that the NPT recognizes in Article IV the inalienable right of the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II, and **recalls** in this context Article III of the NPT and Article II of the IAEA Statute;

13. Calls upon States to adopt stricter national controls for the export of sensitive goods and technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle;

14. Encourages the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply and related measures, as effective means of addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services and minimizing the risk of proliferation, and **urges** the IAEA Board of Governors to agree upon measures to this end as

soon as possible;

15. Affirms that effective IAEA safeguards are essential to prevent nuclear proliferation and to facilitate cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in that regard:

a. Calls upon all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT that have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement or a modified small quantities protocol to do so immediately,

b. Calls upon all States to sign, ratify and implement an additional protocol, which together with comprehensive safeguards agreements constitute essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system,

c. Stresses the importance for all Member States to ensure that the IAEA continue to have all the necessary resources and authority to verify the declared use of nuclear materials and facilities and the absence of undeclared activities, and for the IAEA to report to the Council accordingly as appropriate;

16. Encourages States to provide the IAEA with the cooperation necessary for it to verify whether a state is in compliance with its safeguards obligations, and **affirms** the Security Council's resolve to support the IAEA's efforts to that end, consistent with its authorities under the Charter;

17. Undertakes to address without delay any State's notice of withdrawal from the NPT, including the events described in the statement provided by the State pursuant to Article X of the Treaty, while noting ongoing discussions in the course of the NPT review on identifying modalities under which NPT States Parties could collectively respond to notification of withdrawal, and **affirms** that a State remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal;

18. Encourages States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate, withdraw from, or be found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, the supplier state would have a right to require the return of nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, non-compliance or withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

19. Encourages States to consider whether a recipient State has signed and ratified an additional protocol based on the model additional protocol in making nuclear export decisions;

20. Urges States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate its IAEA safeguards agreement, safeguards shall continue with respect to any nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

21. Calls for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism;

22. Welcomes the March 2009 recommendations of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to make more effective use of existing funding mechanisms, including the consideration of the establishment of a voluntary fund, and **affirms** its commitment to promote full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by Member States by ensuring effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee;

23. Reaffirms the need for full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by Member States and, with an aim of preventing access to, or assistance and financing for, weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery by non-State actors, as defined in the resolution, **calls upon** Member States to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution and the IAEA, including rendering assistance, at their request, for their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) provisions, and in this context **welcomes** the forthcoming comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) with a view to increasing its effectiveness, and **calls upon** all States to participate actively in this review;

24. Calls upon Member States to share best practices with a view to improved safety standards and nuclear security practices and raise standards of nuclear security to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks within four years;

25. Calls upon all States to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets;

26. Calls upon all States to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their

territories, and **calls upon** those States in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard;

27. Urges all States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, to prevent proliferation financing and shipments, to strengthen export controls, to secure sensitive materials, and to control access to intangible transfers of technology;

28. Declares its resolve to monitor closely any situations involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or related material, including to or by non-State actors as they are defined in resolution 1540 (2004), and, as appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security;

29. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Annexe VI: Nuclear disarmament throughout the world

The following figures were provided by the *Arms' Control Association*. Given the generally secret nature of this data, and the way that certain governments treat this type of information, these figures are often approximations.

The five States authorised to possess nuclear weapons according to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

- **China:** 240 weapons
- **France:** 300 operational weapons¹
- **Russia:** approximately 1 566 strategic operational weapons, 2 000 tactical operational weapons, 7 000 weapons in reserve
- **Great Britain:** 160 strategic weapons, a total stockpile of 225
- **United States:** approximately 5 113 active and inactive warheads and 3 500 warheads waiting to be dismantled. The stockpile of 5 113 includes 1 790 strategic weapons that are deployed, and approximately 500 tactical operational weapons, as well as approximately 2 645 inactive weapons.

Countries not authorised under the NPT

- **India:** approximately 100 weapons
- **Israel:** between 75 and 200 weapons
- **Pakistan:** between 70 and 90 weapons.

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¹ c.f. Chapter 1, note 3.