Debate on US-India nuclear technology deal

Upper House

Japan Parliament

14 June 2007

 

Questions asked by Tadashi Inuzuka, a Democratic Party (opposition) member from Nagasaki and member of the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament (PNND)

 

Answers froim officials of the Foreign Ministry and the Cabinet, including some answers by Foreign Minister Taro Aso

Q. Is the deal consistent with Article 1 of the NPT?

A. The US explains that it does not engage military programs and that it
is consistent with the NPT.

Q. Is the deal consistent with the provision of 1995 Principle and
Objectives?

A. We know that there is such a concern, but the details of the deal is
not yet made clear, and we are not in a stage to judge if the deal is
consistent with the 1995 P&O or not.

Q. India claims "India-specific safeguard" that India can keep military
and other sensitive facilities unsafeguarded.

A. We recognize that there is such a concern in international community.
We recognize that we should not "swallow" the explanation by the US and
India on the safeguard as if they were automatically true.

Q. Doesn't it mean that the government has concern on the deal?

A (FM Aso): We has concern on it. We have long asked the US State
Secretary that there should not be a double standard, and that the
conditionality of the nuclear cooperation should be strong and clear enough.

Q. How about the consistency with the UNSC Res 1172?

A. Paragraph 8 of the UNSCR 1172 prohibits any transfers that assist
weapons programs. But the deal will not engage weapons program. So there
should be no problem.

Q. Para 8 of UNSCR 1172 refers to transfers that "could in any way
assist." Japanese translation of the Resolution should be clear and
correct. Do you have any official Japanese translation of the Resolution?

A. We have just a provisional translation for now.

Q. The government should make an official one. The interpretation of the
resolution should be that it prohibits even civilian things if there is
a possibility of conversion to military programs.
Also, it should be noted that the 2000 NPT Final Document reaffirmed the
1995 P&O and UNSCR 1172.

A (FM Aso): Our concern is if the deal would truly be limited to
civilian programs. That point should be very clear and consistent with
the NPT. It is good that they are talking about the division of military
and civilian facilities: we cannot accept if the deal assists any
military programs. However, at the same time, we should consider the
global warming issue and the growing energy demand of India as it is
making a great economic development.

Q. At the NPT PrepCom in Vienna, Switzerland, NAC, Malaysia and others
expressed concern on the issue.

A. We recognize about their statements.

Q. I propose the following conditions should be put to allow nuclear
cooperation with India.
1. Comprehensive safeguard.
2. Moratorium on fissile material production for weapons purposes.
3. Sign and ratify the CTBT.
4. Active participation in the FMCT negotiation.

A. We recognize that there are such voices in the international community.