The Senate,

A. considering the upcoming NPT Review Conference on 2-27 May 2005;

B. considering the adoption by consensus of the Final Document during the 2000 NPT Review Conference, in which the following practical steps were agreed upon:

  1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

  2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty;

  3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years;

  4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

  5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures;

  6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclearweapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI;

  7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions;

  8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency;

  9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

       i. Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;

       ii. Increased transparency by the nuclear weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidencebuilding measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;

      iii. The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

      iv. Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

      v. A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

      vi. The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons;

  10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes;

  11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

  12. Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non- Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament , and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996;

  13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world;

C. considering that the implementation of the Non Proliferation Treaty and the steps agreed upon in the NPT Review Conference of 2000 proved weak in the past years;

D. considering that the continued existence and the strict implementation of the Non Proliferation Treaty are necessary for peace and international security;

E. considering that India, Pakistan and Israel have not signed the Non Proliferation Treaty and have developed nuclear weapons; that North Korea retreated from the Non Proliferation Treaty and has developed nuclear weapons; that Iran is possibly developing nuclear weapons and in any case did not fullfill its declaration and verification obligations towards the IAEA.

F. considering the existence was revealed of a network of illegal trade in nuclear materials, run by the Pakistani Abdul Qadeer Khan;

G. considering that according to the Director-general of the IAEA El Baradei further steps concerning non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are necessary to assure the continued existence of the Non Proliferation Treaty; that he proposes on the one hand measures to strengthen the control and verification on civil nuclear energy and to fight illegal trade of nuclear material and on the other hand a road map towards nuclear disarmament; that he states "We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security - and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use.";

H. considering art. VI of the Non Proliferation Treaty stating "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control";

I. considering the Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 in which the International Court of Justice concludes to the existence of an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

J. considering the resolution of the Chambre on 18 May 2000 concerning nuclear disarmament and the Belgian position on the NPT Review Conference;

K. considering that the government agreement states as one of the main policy principles towards NATO "the reduction of the amount of nuclear weapons; NATO can contribute by deploying no nuclear weapons in the new NATO member states and by reducing the nuclear arsenal in the older NATO member states; the government will propose in NATO more transparency on the nuclear strategy";

L. considering that results on the NPT Review Conference in 2005 are only possible when a coherent policy for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is followed in the different fora where these issues are discussed;

confirming its adherance to the Non Proliferation Treaty;

ASKS THE GOVERNMENT

1. to do all efforts to assure the continued existence of the Non Proliferation Treaty and the strict implementation in all its aspects;

2. promote the adoption of a more strict disarmament road map and of concrete engagements for the coming 5 years and to promote the adoption of a working program in the CD for 2005;

3. to make a policy plan for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation concerning her efforts in the diverse international fora;

4. to assure that non-proliferation initiatives also include a clear component on disarmament and its irreversibility;

5. to assure the consideration inside NATO of practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, conform the conclusions of the NPT Review Conference of 2000;

6. to propose initiatives in NATO concerning:

  6.1. the review of strategic doctrines concerning nuclear weapons;

  6.2. the gradual withdrawal of the American tactical nuclear weapons from Europe as fullfilment of art. VI NPT; taking the necessary diplomatic measures to start in the NATO-Russia Council negotiations on the reduction and the destruction of the American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and the Russian tactical nuclear weapons and their securisation, and to strengthen on this point confidence and transparency measures between NATO and Russia;

  6.3. the application of the irreversibility principle on the non-presence of nuclear weapons in the new NATO member states;

  6.4. steps towards a nuclear weapon free zone, formed by all NNWS in Europe;

  6.5. a transparency policy which goes farther than the existing practice;

7. inside the European Union:

  7.1 to support and actively develop the policy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, by among other issues raising the issue of nuclear disarmament and the presence in Europe of weapons of mass destruction and by implementing as fast as possible the proposed measures concerning the trade in nuclear materials and possible means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the measures demanded by resolution 1540 of the Security Council;

  7.2 to takeinitiatives to exclude any role of nuclear weapons from the common security and defense policy;

8. to support during the NPT Review Conference 2005 and in the preparation of this conference, initiatives concerning:

  8.1. the strengthening and the ratification and implementing in the shortest delays of the CTBT;

  8.2. negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;

  8.3. the review of strategic doctrines;

  8.4. the adoption of interim measures to prevent accidental firing of nuclear weapons;

  8.5. verification, transparency and confidence building measures;

  8.6. the formation of new Nuclear Weapon Free Zones;

  8.7. including the negative security assurances in a juridically binding instrument;

  8.8. the struggle against illegal trade of nuclear materials;

  8.9. the strengthening of the role of the IAEA in the verification and destruction of stocks of fissile material, acceleration of the signing and ratification of the Additional Protocol of the IAEA by all state members of the NPT, the development of a multinational system of production, sale and reprocessing of nuclear fuel for strictly civil aims, support of the proposal of the IAEA director to install a moratorium of 5 years for the construction of uranium enrichment or reproccessing sites;

  8.10. installing measures for international control on nuclear installations of countries which started the procedure to step out of the NPT;

9. to support and to take itself in other multilateral bodies initiatives aimed at non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, especially in the preparation of the Belgian membership in the Security Council to assure that the Security Council takes all its responsabilities towards violations of the NPT.